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Abstract
This paper introduces the concept of intangible assets in sequential supply chains and the
importance of their appropriability in the organizational decision of firms. We focus on the
quality of intellectual property rights (IPR) institutions, which on top of the hold-up problem
between a supplier and the final producer entails an additional risk of imitation as technology
may leak to competing producers in the market. The level of IPR enforcement in the location of
a supplier can therefore play a crucial role in determining the decision of a final good producer
whether to outsource or integrate a particular stage of production. The analysis is performed
with Antra`s and Chor (2013) in the background, where the position of the input along the
supply chain, i.e. its upstreamness, and the degree of sequential complementarity of stage-
specific inputs influence the organizational strategy of firms through the incentive structure of
supplier investments. Our findings show that introducing intangible assets in sequential supply
chain may have the opposite effect of contractibility on outsourcing decision, where only tangible
property rights are considered. We argue therefore that the risk of imitation is a relevant feature
that needs to be accounted for in the incomplete contract literature. Our theoretical predictions
are validated on Slovenian firm-level data.
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1 Introduction
Modern value chains are becoming more and more global in nature, as they are increasingly charac-
terized by the participation of suppliers located across different countries. Incomplete contracts and
contract enforcement continue to be a central issue in this context when studying the integration
versus outsourcing decision of firms.1 The two familiar approaches to confront the issue are the
transaction cost theory (Williamson, 1971, 1975, 1985) and the property right theory (Grossman
and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990). The literature has by now established how specific features
of different production locations such as contract enforcement affect the organizational decision of
firms. Under the transaction cost approach, better contracting institutions reduce hold-up problems
associated with outsourcing and facilitate the exploitation of specialization gains from outsourcing.
With the property rights approach, better contracting institutions mitigate the need to create in-
vestment incentives through outsourcing and enable a firm to reap a larger share of the revenue
through integration. Empirical studies starting from Corcos et al. (2013) all the way up to the
very recent work of Eppinger and Kukharskyy (2017) have found strong evidence for the property
right theory evincing that better institutional quality increases incidences of integration. There are
clearly exceptions such as Defever and Toubal (2013), who for example show evidence in line with the
transaction cost theory that outsourcing prevails for the most productive firms due to its relatively
higher organizational costs.
This paper introduces the concept of intangible assets in supply chains and the importance of
their appropriability in the organizational decision of firms. The simple question we ask is whether
intangible assets are relevant for global value chains. The peculiar feature of intangible assets is that
they exist as dark matter and cannot be observed. We infer the presence of intangible assets by
studying whether the organizational decision of firms react to changes in the strength of intellectual
property rights (IPR) protection. In other words, we exploit observable variation in the IPR regime
to reveal the importance of unobservable intellectual assets and their (non-)appropriability along the
value chain. The focus therefore shifts from property rights to IPRs, which on top of the hold-up
problem between a supplier and the final producer entails an additional risk of imitation as technology
may leak to competing producers in the market. The quality of IPR institutions in the location of
a supplier could therefore play a role in determining the decision of a final good producer whether
to outsource or integrate a particular stage of production. We argue that the risk of imitation is an
important feature that needs to be accounted for in the incomplete contract literature. Practically
all existing works on trade and firm organization have focused on the “tangible” perception of
property rights and hold-up problems, compelling Antra`s and Rossi-Hansberg (2009) to underline
the importance of missing research on how the non-appropriable nature of knowledge may also affect
1See the vast literature on international trade and the boundaries of firms (e.g. Antra`s, 2003, 2005; Antra`s and
Helpman, 2004, 2008; Grossman and Helpman, 2002, 2003, 2005).
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the internalization decision of firms.
The argument takes more importance when considering production stages along the supply chain.
On this, Atalay, Hortacsu and Syverson (2014) emphasize the importance of intangible inputs within
a firm by providing evidence for an alternative rationale behind vertical integration and its role in
promoting efficient intra-firm transfers of intangible inputs such as marketing know-how, intellectual
property, and R&D capital. In other words, they show, in line with the property right theory,
that integration is not a tool to insure a smooth flow of physical inputs from upstream towards
downstream activities, but a strategy to secure efficient transmission of technology across stages
along the chain. A fundamental lesson learned from the work of Atalay, Hortacsu and Syverson
(2014) is the importance of distinguishing intangible assets from tangible ones, and the critical role
of firm organization in their movement along the supply chain. Our analysis takes a step in this
direction, using the sequential production model of Antra`s and Chor (2013) as a tool to explore the
intangible dimension of firm organization.
The sequential dimension of production along the supply chain shows how the position of and
the inter-relation between the stages of production impact firms’ organizational decision through
the structure of incentives for suppliers. If supplier investments are sequential complements, prior
upstream investment by a given supplier would increase marginal returns to investment by the
suppliers performing the next stages of production, whereas in the case of sequential substitutes it
would reduce the marginal revenue of further investment in subsequent stages. As a result, upstream
(downstream) stages are outsourced (integrated) when stages are sequential complements and inte-
grated (outsourced) when they are sequential substitutes. This mechanism works under the property
right approach, where outsourcing, i.e. giving a larger share of the pie to a supplier, encourages in-
vestment by that particular supplier. Alfaro et al. (2015) incorporate the notion of contractibility
from Antra`s and Helpman (2008) into Antra`s and Chor (2013) and interestingly show that better
relative contractibility in the upstream part of the production process tends to increase a firm’s
propensity to integrate in the case of sequential complementarity, whereas it increases outsourcing
when stages are sequential substitutes. They argue that the intuition behind this regularity stems
directly from the property right theory: “the higher the contractibility of inputs, the less firms need
to rely on outsourcing as a way to reverse the distortions associated with inefficient investment by
upstream suppliers.”
Imitation in our framework is embedded into the property right theory, where inefficiencies caused
by contract incompleteness in terms of underinvestment into relation-specific inputs are present both
within firm boundaries and in arm’s length transactions. In the context of sequential production,
the lack of effective IPR protection at any stage of production implies a higher risk of an imitation
shock, reducing profits for the final good producer as well as that of other suppliers within the
chain. To elucidate the concept, think of a supply chain with each stage of production requiring a
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blueprint to be shared between the firm and the supplier. The likelihood for the blueprint at a given
stage to leak outside the supply chain depends solely on the IPR environment at the production
location.2 Weak IPRs increase the arrival rate of imitation similarly for all stages irrespective of their
position, but moving downstream increases the probability of the supply chain being disrupted due
to increased exposure of the chain to imitation. All in all, imitation decreases the value of supplier
investments for the entire supply chain, ex-ante, that is at the moment when the firm decides the
optimal allocation of property rights for each stage before production starts.
The paper delivers a number of clear theoretical predictions that are tested on firm-level data
using a comprehensive dataset on Slovenian firms. We merge transaction-level trade data on firms
together with their outward cross-border direct investment and financial data. Transaction trade
data provides information on the complete set of inputs imported at the firm level, while FDI data
gives the location of related subsidiaries. The firm’s decision to integrate an input is estimated at
the firm-country-product level. It is measured as the propensity to transact an input in a particular
source country within firm boundaries, whereby we distinguish between integration and outsourcing
by exploiting information on the core activity of the firm’s affiliate in a particular host country. We
use industry-pair specific measures of upstreamness in a manner of Alfaro et al. (2015) and identify
whether stages of the value chain are sequential complements or substitutes based on import demand
elasticities for each product category al Antra`s and Chor (2013). In our case, we use import demand
elasticities estimated for core products exported by Slovenian firms obtained from Kee, Nicita, and
Olarreaga (2008) following the “production-based GDP-function” approach. We also introduce new
proxies for complementarity and interdependence between stages within a supply chain by measuring
the degree of inputs differentiation (the extent to which they are spread across diverse industries).
Finally, the IPR enforcement index it retrieved from Park (2008).
Our findings show, in contrast to the tangible property right notion of contractibility in which
stronger enforcement encourages integration and intra-firm trade, IPR protection increases propen-
sity towards international outsourcing by final good producers. This is merely a result of the incentive
structure of supply investment in sequential supply chains, and is obtained without any assumptions
on imitation being specific to outsourcing. As such, our study is not a model prevention of dissipa-
tion, but one on the mitigation of its effect on profits.
This mechanism works in parallel to Antra`s and Chor (2013) and Alfaro et al. (2015), with
the incentive structure of supplier investment at play, producing novel results in the presence non-
appropriable intangible assets. We show that the lack of the protection of intellectual property
induces firms to hold on to a larger share of the revenue by opting for integration when inputs are
sequential complements. This is driven by imitation creating uncertainty about the future of the
2Following the literature, we consider investments to be for customization purposes with no intrinsic value outside
the relationship. The interaction between a supplier and the firm is therefore not affected by imitation as we are
dealing with a supply chain and inter-related technologies rather than a one-to-one buyer-supplier relationship.
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supply chain, making outsourcing a less meaningful tool to create investment incentives for suppliers
located further downstream. The final producer therefore chooses to hold on to a larger share of
revenues and integrates that stage. This tends to occur at the most downstream outsourced stages,
making integration the outcome at an earlier (more upstream) stage of production. There are the
stages that are most sensitive to IPRs in the supplier location. Strengthening the IPR regime puts
the property right channel back in place, allowing the firm in control of the supply chain to exploit
the advantages of outsourcing on supplier incentives to invest.
The results hint at a reduction in imitation-induced integration in the relatively downstream
stages, expanding the range of inputs in the supply chain that are outsourced. This highlights the
crucial role of IPRs for the organizational mode along “complementary” stages. However, we observe
both theoretically and empirically that the protection of intangible assets tend to be a less relevant
argument when stages are sequential substitutes. Conceptually, this is because the static and the
dynamic effects of the organizational mode on supplier investments work against each other in the
latter case. The dynamic negative effect of outsourcing on investment and revenues dominate when
IPRs are strong (yielding the Antra`s and Chor (2013) case), whereas they are reduced in magnitude
under imitation and offset by the positive static effect.3
Our results obtain at the product level, and when aggregated to show the proportion of a firm’s
integrated inputs in each partner country. The findings remain robust to a series of checks that
control for unobserved firm-specific effects and unobserved heterogeneity. The idea is further con-
firmed by showing that the regularity only holds for intangible assets as other institutional features
relevant for contract enforcement such as the rule of law do not reproduce the effect of IPRs. We
also complement the original measure of input complementarity/substitutability with a direct proxy
for the degree of differentiation between inputs throughout the analysis and obtain a similar pattern
for all cases.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief background on our
baseline theoretical framework that is essentially derived from Antra`s and Chor (2013) and Alfaro
et al. (2015). In Section 3 we introduce the presence of intangible assets and the possibility of
imitation into the model. Section 4 introduces the data and provides a detailed description of the
measures used in our specifications. In section 5 we directly test the predictions of our model and
discuss the evidence obtained on the validity of our hypothesis on the relevance of intellectual assets
in comparison with the underlying theory. Section 6 concludes and put forth avenues for further
research.
3By static we intend the impact of outsourcing/integration on incentives for supplier investment in the same stage,
and by dynamic on all the upcoming stages along the supply chain.
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2 Theoretical Background
For expositional convenience, we introduce the theoretical framework by considering, first, the base-
line model, which basically corresponds to the model of Antra`s and Chor (2013) in its simplest
version. After having acquainted the reader with the mechanisms at work in this type of setting, we
will then extend the model in Section 3, by introducing and modelling the risk of imitation and by
illustrating how this innovation will affect the main theoretical results.
2.1 The baseline model: key-assumptions
We consider an economy in which the final good is available in many differentiated varieties, each one
manufactured by a monopolistically competitive producer. Preferences are described by a standard
CES utility function, thereby each producer (the firm) faces a demand for its variety given by
q = Ap−
1
1−ρ , (1)
where A > 0 is a demand shifter that the firm treats as exogenous; p is the profit-maximizing price
for the variety, set by the firm; and ρ ∈ (0, 1) is a measure of elasticity of the final demand, since it
is positively related to 1/(1− ρ), i.e. the degree of substitutability among varieties.
While the representation of demand side of the economy is stripped-down, the supply side features
more complexity. In order for a unit of each variety to be produced, there is a continuum of stages
of production that must be completed in a precise order, dictated by technology. Each stage is
therefore indexed by z ∈ [0, 1], where z = 0 is the first stage to be performed (the most upstream),
whereas z = 1 is the last one (the most downstream). To make the model easier, we consider the
case in which all stages are symmetric except for their position along the production line.
At the end of each stage z, a (quality-adjusted) quantity of intermediate good x(z) is delivered
to the next stage of production for further reprocessing. Hence, at each stage of production, the
intermediate input gets closer to the final good variety. A key-feature of the model is that, at any
stage z, the intrinsic value of the variety can be increased by means of a stage-specific investment,
with marginal cost c > 0, which is intended to raise the level of customization of the intermediate
good.4 It follows that the quality-adjusted volume of the final good production is a function of all
the stage-specific investments in input services undertaken along the value chain, i.e.
q = θ
(∫ 1
0
x(z)αI(z) dz
)1/α
, (2)
where θ is a productivity parameter, which reflects heterogeneity among firms; α ∈ (0, 1) is the
4Both the firm and its suppliers are assumed to be capable of producing a non-customized input at a zero marginal
cost, which allows for the continuation of the production process but does not add any value to final-good production.
5
degree of physical input substitutability; and I(z) is an indicator function which report us whether
stage z has been completed or not. This feature makes the production process inherently sequential,
since downstream stages are useless unless inputs from upstream stages have been delivered.
We assume that, albeit in control of the whole production process, the firm is unable to complete
any single stage of this process without cooperating with a dedicated supplier. Hence, for each stage
z, there is a bundle of suppliers endowed with the skills or the know-how required for performing
stage z by customizing the product; we also assume that suppliers have a strong preference for staying
into the relationship with the firm, their outside option being normalized to zero. As a result, at all
stages of production, a supplier engages into a stage-specific contractual relationship with the firm
for the procurement of a fully customized input x(z), which is of worthless for alternative buyers.
We can thus interpret x(z) in equation (2) as a measure of the level of investment by supplier z.
The last ingredient to be added in the model is contract incompleteness. We assume that none
of the aspects of input production can be disciplined by means of a comprehensive ex-ante con-
tract, which obviously may give rise to a standard hold-up inefficiency in form of suppliers’ under-
investment. In particular, we consider the case in which the initial contract specifies only whether
the supplier appointed at stage z will be integrated within the firm’s boundaries or will remain in-
dependent as stand-alone entity. For further details about the key-assumptions of the model, please
refer to the original work of Antra`s and Chor (2013) or Alfaro et al. (2015).
2.2 The baseline model: equilibrium
The timing of the model is therefore the following. The firm posts contracts for suppliers for each
stage z ∈ [0, 1], stating the organizational mode (integration or outsourcing), and then chooses for
each z one supplier among the applicants. Production then takes place sequentially. The supplier
appointed for stage z is handed the semi-finished good completed up to that stage in production,
and is supposed to deliver its intermediate input to the immediate downstream supplier. Because of
incomplete contracts, supplier z is free to choose the volume of input services x(z) that maximizes
its profits, conditional on the value of the intermediate good that has been delivered to it.
This choice is based on two considerations. The first concerns the organizational mode chosen
by the firm at stage z. Under vertical integration, the firm is in control of the physical assets
used in the production of the intermediate input, which allows it to extract more surplus from the
stage-specific investment in input customization. We model this aspect by assuming that, when the
supplier is integrated within the firm boundaries, the firm appropriates of a large share of the value
of supplier z’s incremental contribution to the total revenue, this share being denoted by βV ∈ (0, 1).
At the opposite, under outsourcing strategy, the firm receives only a share βO < βV of that surplus,
while the rest accrues to the supplier. It stands to reason that, foreseeing a lower return to their
investments, integrated suppliers will under-invest relatively more than stand-alone ones.
6
The second determinant of the supplier investment decision is represented precisely by the value
of its incremental contribution to the firm total revenue, i.e. by size of the surplus over which the
supplier and the firm engage in a generalized Nash bargaining.5 This incremental contribution can
be proved to be
r′(z) =
ρ
α
(
A1−ρθρ
)α
ρ · [r(z)] ρ−αρ · [x(z)]α , (3)
which is the derivative in z of the revenue function valued at stage z, namely
r(z) = A1−ρθρ
(∫ z
0
x(s)α ds
) ρ
α
.
According to equation (3), the marginal contribution of supplier z can be either increasing or de-
creasing in the revenue secured up to a stage z, i.e. in the amount of prior upstream investments,
summarized in r(z). Indeed, everything depends on the relative size of parameters ρ (the final
demand elasticity) and α (the degree of physical input complementarity). If ρ > α, then higher
investments by upstream suppliers increase the marginal return of supplier z’s own investment. Fol-
lowing Antra`s and Chor (2013) and Alfaro et al. (2015), we will refer to this case as the complements
case, given that investment choices turn out to be sequential complements along the production line.
At odds, if ρ < α, higher investments by upstream suppliers reduce the marginal return of invest-
ment by supplier z; we will refer to this occurrence as the substitutes case, since investment decisions
become sequential substitutes along the value chain.6
Hence, at the beginning of each stage z, the supplier is handed the intermediate product com-
pleted up to that stage and learns about the value of this product, i.e. r(z) in equation (3). Based on
this, and based on the share β(z) = {βO, βV } chosen by the firm at stage z, the supplier determines
its optimal input level, namely x(z), solving the following problem:
max
x(z)
(1− β(z))r′(z)− cx(z) .
The equilibrium of the game implied by the model can be solved by backward induction. Knowing the
suppliers’ optimal investment choice conditional on the organization mode, the firm can determine
the pattern of ownership rights along the supply chain that maximizes its own profits. The firm’s
problem therefore consists of finding, for each z ∈ [0, 1], the optimal value of share β(z) between βO
5The actual payment to each supplier is negotiated bilaterally only after that the corresponding stage has been
completed, and the terms of exchange are not renegotiated at a later stage. Moreover, this negotiation is treated as
independent from bilateral negotiations that take place at other stages of production.
6Given α ∈ (0, 1), supplier investments are always (weakly) complementary from a purely technological standpoint,
which makes the complements case intuitively clear. However, under some circumstances, supplier investments (in
quality-adjusted terms) may turn into sequential substitutes, as a result of a revenue effect large enough to dominate the
physical input complementarity effect. This occurs for sufficiently low value of ρ ∈ (0, 1) (the final demand elasticity),
which makes the firm’s revenue function highly concave in quality-adjusted output; large upstream investment levels
therefore significantly reduce the value of undertaking downstream investments.
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and βV , thereby determining whether the contract relative to any input z will be associated with
integration or outsourcing. In formal terms, the problem can be written as
max
β(z)∈{βO,βV }
pi = Φ
∫ 1
0
β(z)
(
1− β(z)) α1−α [ ∫ z
0
(
1− β(s)) α1−α ds] ρ−αα(1−ρ) dz , (4)
where Φ is a constant term. We refer the reader to Antra`s and Chor (2013) for a detailed derivation
of the solution to this problem, which identifies the optimal organizational structures represented in
Figure 1. In the complements case (ρ > α), there exists a unique cut-off stage z∗C ∈ (0, 1], such that
all earlier stages are outsourced, and all later stages are integrated within firm boundaries. At the
opposite, in the substitutes case (ρ > α), the unique cut-off is represented by a production stage
z∗S ∈ (0, 1] such that all upstream stages are retained within firm boundaries, whereas all stages
located downstream are associated with outsourcing.
In Figure 2 we provide a graphical representation of the key-insight behind these patterns, by
considering a relaxed version of the firm’s problem, in which the optimal share β(z) is not constrained
to be either βV or βO, but can take any real value (we only require β(z) to be a piece-wise continu-
ously differentiable real-valued function of z). As shown in the figure, in the complements case the
optimal share β∗(z) is an increasing function of z, which means that integration gets more appealing
to the firm, the more production moves downstream. Since supplier investments are sequential com-
plements, a virtuous cycle of investments may be triggered by incentivizing upstream investments
by means of outsourcing. At a given stage of production, the marginal return to investments will
be so high that suppliers will keep investing even if integrated, thus the firm will focus on the rent-
extraction motive for integration. This pattern is no longer consistent when suppliers investments
are sequential substitutes, since large upstream investments (secured by arm’s length arrangements)
would dampen the incentives for downstream suppliers. The optimal pattern of ownership rights is
then reversed, in compliance with β∗(z) being a decreasing function of z.
Figure 1: Optimal pattern of ownership along the value chain (baseline model).
Source: Alfaro et al. (2015).
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Figure 2: Profit-maximizing division of surplus for stage z (baseline model).
Source: Supplement to Antra`s and Chor (2013).
3 Non-appropriability of Intellectual Assets
In this Section we propose an extension of the baseline model in which firms are exposed to the risk
of their final-good variety being imitated by potential competitors, thereby highlighting how the op-
timal firm-boundary choices along the value chain might be affected by the degree of appropriability
of intellectual assets. In so doing, we introduce a completely new element in the analysis, represented
by the intangible dimension of production within modern supply chains and, consequently, by the
role of intellectual property rights (IPR) protection.
3.1 The generalized model: introducing the risk of imitation
We consider a supply chain in which completing each stage of production with a fully customized
input requires a two-way transfer of a different blueprint between the firm in control of the whole
production process and the supplier appointed at that stage. Every blueprint contains (least part
of) the relevant technology for developing that stage in production, or the know-how developed as a
result of the investment in customization undertaken by the supplier. If the institutional environment
in which production occurs were characterized by incomplete contracts but full IPR enforcement,
the technology transfer would be smooth, safe and complete; the output of the final good q would be
realized with the accomplishment of stage z=1 and the total revenue from the sale of each variety
would be collected by the corresponding firm. The organizational structure of the supply chain
would therefore be the one described in Section 2.2.
Consider now the case in which contract incompleteness combines together with the lack of full
IPR protection. In this setting, a potential competitor of the final-good producers can come up
with a copy of one of the varieties available in the market, and can start supplying this product
without incurring in sanctions or penalties. Think of this competitor as an agent who is able to
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produce only a subpar version of the final good (of zero value for the market) since it misses the
relevant technology for customizing the inputs and thereby creating its own differentiated variety.
If intellectual property is not adequately protected, during the technology transfer among the firm
and one of its suppliers, part of the content of the blueprint might somehow be diffused outside the
relationship, in form of leaks or disclosure of relevant information or, more simply, of evidence about
the intrinsic characteristics of the product. Based on this, a potential competitor can infer or acquire
the know-how for reproducing the original production process, imitating the final good variety and
thereby inflicting a dead-weight loss to the original producer (the firm) and all its suppliers.7
We assume that imitation is costless for the potential competitor and is independent of the firm-
boundary choices along the value chain, thereby excluding that one specific organizational mode
might be used strategically by the firm to reduce the risk of its variety being imitated. In our
model the economic value is indeed generated across production stages by overlapping investments
in input customization, which stem from the fruitful cooperation between the firm and the suppliers,
regardless of whether the latter are independent or not. Hence, even allowing for product imitation,
we assume that the outside option of each supplier remains zero, on the ground that a stand-alone
blueprint has no intrinsic value for the supplier outside the relationship with the firm.
A key-feature of our variant of Antra`s and Chor (2013) is that we treat imitation as an exogenous
shock that can occur at any stage of production, according to a standard Poisson process with
arrival rate µ > 0. Intuitively, this rate is inversely related to the strength of IPR protection in the
location in which production occurs (in addition to other intrinsic characteristics of the technology
of production): the higher is the level of safeguard of intellectual property, the more µ approaches to
zero, thereby restoring the baseline version of the model without imitation. Notice that the arrival
rate of the shock is here assumed to be independent of the level of investment of each individual
supplier and, more in general, to be homogeneous across stages. In principle, one could think of the
blueprint transferred at given stage z as more relevant for allowing imitation of the final product,
as compared to the blueprint transferred at any other stage of the supply chain. However, modeling
this aspect would entail specifying the location (upstream or downstream) of the “relevant” stage,
i.e. a feature of the technology of production that might vary from one industry to another one.
Assuming a constant µ across stages therefore appears as the most neutral assumption that can be
put forth in order to capture the effect that we are mostly interested in.
Once the shock has arrived, i.e. imitation has occurred, none of the participants in the original
value chain are willing to invest in the process any longer. Given the properties of the Poisson
7In this paper, we do not characterize the equilibrium in the final-good market in the presence of imitation, our
interest being on the way according to which firms strategically modify the organizational structure of the supply
chains to internalize their exposure to the risk of imitation. It suffices to say that imitation is always beneficial for
the potential competitor, whatever is the division of the market with the original producer, whereas it is always
detrimental for the firm and for all its suppliers, reducing their surplus necessarily due to the loss of exclusivity of the
manufactured product.
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process, the expected value of supplier investments at stage z is therefore
e−µzx(z) + (1− e−µz)0 = e−µzx(z) ,
where e−µz is the probability that, up to the moment in which supplier z enters the production line,
imitation has not occurred and the whole production process is still in place.
Based on these assumptions, we can derive a particular statistical representation for the (quality-
adjusted) value of production ex-ante, i.e. at the moment (corresponding to stage 0) at which the
firm has to decide the optimal allocation of property rights along the value chain. This is a modified
version of equation (2), and precisely
q = θ
(∫ 1
0
[e−µzx(z)]αI(z) dz
)1/α
. (5)
Notice that, according to the above specification, the ex-ante value of the input services declines
as far as we consider more downstream suppliers. It is important to stress that this is simply the
result of their position along the supply chain, which increases the probability for their contribution
to be zero, given that imitation will be more likely to have occurred by the time at which their
contribution is required. Hence, the expected value of investments by downstream suppliers only
depends on the engineering order of their participation to the supply chain, and not on their lower
propensity to invest in input customization (conditional on imitation not having occurred).
The other elements of the model remain the same as in the baseline version, particularly the
interaction between the supplier and the firm. Indeed, introducing non-appropriability of intellectual
assets does not alter this type of interaction, as long as we deal with sequential production processes
and inter-related technologies, rather than one-to-one buyer-supplier relationships.
3.2 The generalized model: equilibrium
We now characterize the optimal organizational structure of the supply chain for the case of our
generalized version of the model. While we discuss here the main insights behind our results,
Appendix A reports a more detailed derivation of the solution of the generalized firms’ problem,
where the latter corresponds to the following program:
max
β(z)∈{βO,βV }
pi = Φ
∫ 1
0
β(z)
[
e−µz
(
1− β(z))] α1−α [ ∫ z
0
[
e−µs
(
1− β(s))] α1−α ds] ρ−αα(1−ρ) dz . (6)
Consider Figure 3, which is the counterpart of Figure 2 for the extended model with risk of imitation.
The function β∗(z) reported in the figure is then the solution to a relaxed version of program (6), in
which the optimal share β(z) is not necessarily chosen in the pair of values βO and βV , but can take
any value in the interval [0, 1]. In analogy with the baseline model, β∗(z) is an increasing function
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of z in the complements case (ρ > α), while it is a decreasing function of z in the substitutes case
(ρ < α). The two patterns identified in Section 2.2 are therefore still valid: even under risk of
imitation, the firm will outsource upstream and integrate downstream in the first case; and will
integrate upstream and outsource downstream in the second.8
Figure 3: Profit-maximizing division of surplus for stage z (generalized model).
However, Figure 3 reveals a crucial aspect which differentiates the case of non-appropriable
intellectual assets (low IPR protection, i.e. µ > 0) with respect to the baseline model (where µ = 0,
because of full IPR protection). In the complements case, at any stage z the optimal value of β(z) is
indeed higher in case of non-appropriable intellectual assets (dashed line) than in the case with full
appropriability (solid line); thus, the non-appropriability of intellectual assets increases the overall
appeal of the integration strategy along the supply chain. At odds, in the substitutes case, a weak
IPR regime tends to decrease the incidence of integration; for any z ∈ [0, 1], the optimal value of
β(z) is indeed lower in the event of µ > 0 (dashed line) than in the baseline model, where µ = 0
(solid line). Based on this, we can derive the following predictions, illustrated in Figure 4.
Proposition 1 In the complements case (ρ > α), the cut-off stage z∗C ∈ (0, 1], such that all upstream
stages are outsourced, and all downstream stages are integrated, is decreasing in µ, and therefore
increasing in the level of appropriability of intellectual assets (i.e. the strength of IPR protection in
the location in which production occurs).
Proposition 2 In the substitutes case (ρ < α), the cut-off stage z∗S ∈ (0, 1], such that all upstream
stages are integrated, and all downstream stages are outsourced, is increasing in µ, and therefore
decreasing in the level of appropriability of intellectual assets (i.e. the strength of IPR protection in
the location of production).
8As in Antra`s and Helpman (2004, 2008), the solution to the relaxed problem is used to establish whether the
firm will choose outsourcing or integration at the very beginning of the supply chain, selecting the higher (βV ) or the
lower (βO) value of β(z) at z = 0. As regard to the baseline model, Antra`s and Chor (2013) provide a clear treatment
of the conditions under which (i) integration and outsourcing coexist along the value chain and (ii) the set of stages
under a common organizational form (integration or outsourcing) is a connected interval in [0,1]. The same conditions
apply to the our variant of the model (see Appendices A-2, A-3 and A-4).
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Figure 4: Optimal pattern of ownership along the value chain (baseline model).
We can rationalize Proposition 1 as follows. When supplier investments are sequential comple-
ments, the preferred option at the beginning of the chain is outsourcing, to secure a large amount of
upstream investments that will raise incentives for downstream suppliers. Under risk of imitation,
the positive dynamic effect of upstream investment is increasingly offset along the supply chain by
a higher probability of disruption of the production process. This induces firms to focus on rent
extraction therefore increasing its propensity to integrate as production moves downstream. The
firm will therefore anticipate the stage at which integration occurs. Enforcing IPRs (i.e. lower µ)
tends to restore the original cut-off that characterizes the baseline version of the model, extending
the range of stages that are outsourced.
A similar argument can be used also for Proposition 2. In the substitutes case, upstream stages
are associated with integration, thereby avoiding the negative effect on incentives for downstream
suppliers that would be generated by outsourcing and therefore by large upstream investments.
Under imitation, a lower probability of survival works against the negative dynamic effect that
outsourcing exerts on investment at more downstream stages. One can think of such uncertainty
bringing forward the final stage of production in view of the firm, rendering a larger pie at any
given stage through outsourcing more attractive. The negative effect of outsourcing on investment
at future stages is mitigated as the production process is less likely to reach the next stage. As a
result, outsourcing becomes more appealing as a strategy at relatively earlier stages of production,
as compared to the baseline model. Also in this case, enforcing IPR has the effect to restore the
original cut-off even though, in this case, by reducing the range of stages that are outsourced.9
The last theoretical prediction of the model regards the heterogeneous impact of IPR protection
in the case of complements and substitutes. In Appendix A-5 we show that, for a given absolute
difference of parameters α and ρ, the derivative of β∗(z) with respect to µ is larger when the
difference is negative (α < ρ) rather than positive (α > ρ). This means that a change in level of IPR
9Both the cut-off stages z∗C and z
∗
S are derived in a closed-form solution in Appendix A-4.
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protection has a larger (lower) effect on the optimal share of ownership at any stage of production,
as far as supplier investments are sequential complements (substitutes) along the value chain. We
can therefore establish Proposition 3.
Proposition 3 Ceteris paribus, the choice of the organizational mode at each stage of production is
more sensitive to the degree of appropriability of intellectual assets (the strength of IPR protection)
in the complements case (ρ > α), rather than in the substitutes case (ρ < α).
The intuition behind this result can be illustrated by noticing that a given organization mode,
say outsourcing, always exerts two types of effects. One is the “dynamic” effect, i.e. the effect on
the incentives for all downstream suppliers, that can be either positive or negative (for outsourcing)
depending on whether supplier investments are, respectively, complements or substitutes along the
supply chain. The second effect is the “static” effect, which refers to the level of supplier investment
at the stage in which this organization mode occurs. In the case of outsourcing, this effect is
always positive: ceteris paribus, an integrated supplier will underinvest as compared to a stand-alone
supplier, regardless of the nature of suppliers investments (complements or substitutes). Under full
IPR protection, the dynamic effect is paramount and drives the allocation of property rights across
all stages of production, making the “static” effect of each organization mode of limited relevance
to this purpose. Under a weak IPR regime, instead, the dynamic effect becomes less relevant as the
firm discounts what occurs at the next stages of production by the lower probability that production
will still be in place (more and more blueprints are transferred as production moves downstream).
We can therefore detect an evident asymmetry between the case of complements and substitutes. In
the complements case, the dynamic effect of outsourcing is positive at any stage of production but
gets weaker, the weaker is the level of enforcement of IPRs; however, the decision to outsource at
a given stage z will always be supported by the positive static effect associated with this particular
organization mode. On the contrary, in the substitutes case the dynamic effect of outsourcing
is negative for all z; with the lack of IPR protection, this effect gets weaker and finds stronger
opposition by the static effect, which is positive. Integration and outsourcing are therefore more
interchangeable among each other at all stages of the supply chain, which explains why enforcing or
not enforcing IPRs has a weaker impact on organization in this second case.
3.3 From theory to empirics: testable predictions
It follows from the model that IPRs bear important implications for firm decision on the organization
mode at different (sequential) production stages and different degrees of sequential complementarity
of its inputs/stages. For any given location, a firm decides to integrate or outsource stage z based on
the characteristics of its inputs. However, we observed that technology and final demand-side factors
(e.g. α, ρ, upstreamness) cannot entirely explain the outsourcing/integration decision across different
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markets and production stages. Our argument is that this is due to the existence of intangible assets
along the value chain. The theory therefore focuses on the role of IPR protection as one of the crucial
market-specific characteristics behind the firms’ decision on organization of their global value chains
when assets are not fully appropriable.
Based on the propositions of the theoretical model we derive predictions to be tested empirically
on the firm-level data about the effects of IPR enforcement on firms’ outsourcing versus integra-
tion decision along their sequential supply chains. As shown by the model, the strength of IPR
protection in the location of production of an input affects the incidence of internalization, and the
impact depends on the position of the stage along the value chain and varies systematically between
sequential complements and substitutes.
We formulate three principal testable predictions as follows:
Prediction 1. When inputs are sequential complements, imitation risk increases likelihood of
integration of the firm; within a firm, this occurs for the more downstream stages not yet integrated.
Recall that in the case of sequential complements, downstream stages are already integrated.
Prediction 1 suggests that among the stages not yet integrated, those that lie more downstream on
the value chain are most sensitive to IPR protection. Hence, it is in those relatively downstream
stages, where we expect to observe reduced incentives to integrate as a result of stronger IPR
protection.
Prediction 2. When inputs are sequential substitutes, imitation risk increases likelihood of
outsourcing of the firm; within a firm, this occurs for the more downstream stages not yet outsourced.
Recall that in the case of sequential substitutes, downstream stages are already outsourced.
Prediction 2 suggests that among the stages not yet outsourced, those that lie more downstream on
the value chain are most sensitive to IPR protection. Hence, it is in those relatively downstream
stages, where we expect to observe increased incentives to integrate as a result of stronger IPR
protection.
Prediction 3. IPR enforcement is more relevant for the organizational decision when inputs
are sequential complements.
Proposition 3 suggested that the impact of imitation on supply chains with inputs that are
sequential substitutes are weaker than those with sequential complements. Prediction 3 derives from
this result, implying reduced relevance of the choice of the organizational mode under sequential
substitutes when a firm faces imitation. Intangible assets and IPRs should therefore not have a
significant effect on the integration decision of firms in supply chains with such characteristics.
To test the above predictions, ideally one would need firm level data on the entire set of inputs
sourced from different countries along the entire supply chain together with information whether the
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inputs are provided internally within the firm or procured from non-related firms. Since such a rich
and detailed database on the level of firms’ trade transactions further disaggregated into intra-firm
and arm’s lengths type is not readily available, at least for a wider spectrum of industries and firms,
our approach exploits the availability of matched firm-level transaction trade data and firms’ bilat-
eral foreign direct investment flows. Apart from the firm decision on outsourcing versus integration
of different inputs in different markets, empirical testing of the model’s predictions requires the iden-
tification of the position of a particular input in the value chain, i.e., upstreamness, and distinction
between sequential complements and substitutes cases. The approach we follow in the construction
of our core variables and data sources are described below.
4 Data and Key Variables
The dataset we use consists of four distinct databases covering the population of Slovenian firms
in the 2007-2010 period. Our core database includes transaction-level trade data at the 8-digit
level of European Combined Nomenclature (hereinafter CN) classification provided by Statistical
Office of the Republic of Slovenia (SURS). This is merged by the unique firm identifiers with (i)
detailed information on direction of firms’ cross-border direct investment outflows provided by Bank
of Slovenia and (ii) with firms’ financial statements data from the Agency for Public Legal Records
and Related Services (hereinafter APLR). Hence, we have on disposal firms’ annual export and
import transactions to/from partner countries as well as their outward FDI positions in respective
host partner countries. Additionally, we use a database on the performance of the affiliates of
Slovenian firms located abroad provided by Bank of Slovenia, which contains further information on
affiliates performance, core industry of activity and trade flows, e.g. total exports and imports of
affiliates, their total intra-firm trade and sales in the local (host) market.
Slovenia is a highly open, small economy from the group of CEE transition economies that since
the mid-1990s has been heavily involved in both multilateral liberalization and regional integration
processes mostly related to approaching EU membership: (i) accession to the GATT (WTO) in 1994
(1995); (ii) CEFTA membership in 1996; (iii) signing of an Association Agreement with the EU in
1996 and provisionally enforced in 1997; and (iv) EU accession negotiations between 1998-2002. In
year 2004 Slovenia became a full member of the EU and adopted, as the first new EU member state,
Euro in 2007. Liberalization processes contributed to increasing involvement of Slovenian companies
in global value chains (hereafter GVC). According to the WTO Slovenia is classified among the high-
(GVC) participation economies and recorded a GVC participation index of 58.7 in 2011 which is
significantly above the average value for developed and developing countries, i.e. 48.6 and 48.0,
respectively, mostly on account of strong backward participation (WTO, 2016) as shown in Table
B1 of the Appendix. Figures B1 and B2 in the Appendix also show the value-added components of
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gross exports for Slovenia in 1995 and in 2011, together with the comparison between inward and
outward FDI. It is clear from the figure that outward FDI dominates for Slovenia and that the gap
between inward and outward FDI has been expanding over the last decade.
These developments support our belief that the comprehensive database of Slovenian firms offers
a suitable setting for studying firm organization behavior along international value chains. In our
final sample, we have 6010 firms that record imports from 171 and/or outward FDI with 37 different
partner countries.
4.1 Dependent variable - binary variable on the decision to integrate
We aim to measure the decision to integrate or outsource inputs in different countries at different
stages of the value chain. In so doing, we combine trade and FDI flow firm-level data to estimate
the propensity of a firm to integrate an input supplier. For the purpose of our analysis, we define
products (inputs) as the 6-digit level product groups of CN classification that is in full compliance
with the 6-digit Harmonized system (hereinafter HS) code. Transaction trade data provides us with
information on the complete set of inputs sourced from abroad at the firm-level, while FDI data gives
the location of the dependent establishments. We, however, do not have information on the extent
to which trade flows are carried out within the firm (intra-firm trade). Earlier studies have faced
the issue by exploiting available industry-level intra-firm trade data and using the share of intra-
firm imports in total inputs as an indication of the propensity to transact a particular input within
firm boundaries, e.g. Antra`s and Chor (2013). Follow-up studies instead define the integration vs
outsourcing decision based on the (core) activities of establishments linked via ownership ties (net
of subsidiaries of the “global ultimate owner”), e.g. in Alfaro et al. (2015). While the former
approach lacks information on the identity (activity) of the individual buyer, the latter does not use
trade data and therefore uses Input-Output tables to determine the set of outsourced inputs without
information on their location, which is in the focus of this paper.
We distinguish between integration and outsourcing by exploiting information on the core activity
of the firm’s affiliate in a particular host country in the manner adopted in Alfaro et al. (2015). We
regard those inputs sourced by the parent firm from its affiliate’s host country that are classified
under the core activity of the affiliate as integrated inputs. More specifically, inputs a firm imports
from its affiliate’s host country that are classified under the core activity of the affiliate at the 4-digit
industry level are regarded as integrated, whereas all other imported inputs from this country are
considered as being outsourced. Doing this therefore accounts for the fact that a firm may engage
in both integration and outsourcing in a partner country. In case a firm has no FDI in a partner
country, all imports coming from that country are regarded as being outsourced. Such formulation
allow us to estimate the regression model at the most disaggregated firm-market-product level. The
dependent variable is defined as a firm’s binary decision on whether or not to integrate a particular
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input supplier in a certain market, i.e. the propensity to transact an input in a particular source
country within firm boundary. Moreover, it allows us to consider firm-input specific upstreamness
measure for all bilateral firm transactions. We link the core activity of an affiliate and imported
inputs by the parent company by first adopting Ramon’s concordance from 6-digit HS 2002 to 6-digit
CPA 2002 classification, and subsequently from CPA 2002 to NACE Rev. 1 at the 4-digit level based
on the direct linkage in the structure of these two classifications.10 In year 2007, the HS classification
underwent a substantial revision, therefore a pairing of HS6 2007 to HS6 2002 codes was required
for the purpose of the linking core activity of an affiliate and imported inputs. In converting HS
2007 to HS 2002 codes we lean on the Van Beveren et al. (2012) concordance approach, but assign
one single code of an HS 2002 edition to each HS 2007 code. This requires certain simplifications in
the event that the HS 2007 code is the result of either merging (1:n relationship) or splitting and
merging (n:n relationship) of several codes in the previous 2002 classification. In this case, we follow
the United Nations Statistics Division (2009) and give priority to the one subheading among several
that has the same code as the HS 2007 subheading (if it exists). The retained code rule is based on
the general WCO praxis to maintain the existing code only if there has been no substantial changes
of its scope.
4.2 Complementarity/substitutability
To distinguish between sequential substitutes and complements we follow Antra`s and Chor (2013)
and Alfaro et al. (2015) and trace substitutes/complements based on low/high value of import de-
mand elasticities faced by the buyers of a particular good. We consider import demand elasticity of
a firm’s core export product, i.e. the product at 6-digit level of HS classification which accounts for
the largest share in exports of a particular firm. As stressed by Antra`s and Chor (2013), this ap-
proach implies the assumption that any existing cross-industry variation in elasticity of technological
substitution across firms’ inputs is largely uncorrelated with the elasticity of demand. Complements
(d compl = 1) are characterized by above-median import demand elasticity for a firm’s core export
product and substitutes (d compl = 0) by below-median demand elasticity. We use import demand
elasticities estimated at 6-digit level HS product level for Slovenia by Kee, Nicita and Olarreaga
(2008) following the production-based GDP function approach. Their estimated import demand
elasticities are defined as the percentage change in the quantity of an imported good when the price
of this good increases by 1%, holding prices of all other goods, productivity, and endowments of the
economy constant.
We complement this standard measure of distinguishing between sequential complements and
substitutes in several ways. First, we propose an original proxy for α, based on the premise that
degree of physical input substitutability is closely related to the degree of input differentiation.
10CPA classification is a product classification whose elements are for the goods part based on the HS classification.
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We assume that inputs classified within the same industry at certain digit-level of classification
exhibit higher technological substitutability compared to inputs classified in different industries at
the particular level of aggregation. To reflect substitutability among inputs in this regard we compute
a Herfindahl index (Hit), which measures how (6-digit) imported inputs by a firm are spread across
different (3-digit) industries. Our Hit counts 3-digit imported product groups and weights them by
the abundance of 6-digit product categories within each 3-digit group:
Hit = 1−
N3dig∑
n=1
(
#(6digitHS)n
N
)2
, (7)
where n denotes product category at a 3-digit level of HS, N3dig represents number of 3-digit product
categories of HS, and N the total number of imported products at 6-digit level of HS. When all
imported inputs are classified under the same 3-digit industry, i.e. in case of high degree of input
substitutability, H is equal to 0, whereas in case each input is classified under a different 3-digit
category, H = (N −1)/N . In the next stage, we compute average values of the Herfindahl index Hit
across 3-digit industries to obtain industry-specific (inverse) alpha measure Hjt.
Our first alternative approach of distinguishing between sequential substitutes and complements
rests on below and above median value of the industry-level Herfindahl index, Hjt: in case a firm
is classified in an industry with a below average value of Hjt, i.e. relatively high substitutability
among inputs, d complalpha ind = 0 representing substitutes, while for an above average value of the
index Hjt, d complalpha ind = 1 denoting sequential complements. This definition still implies the
assumption of independence between ρ and α.
Therefore, we proceed with our second alternative for sequential substitutes/complements identi-
fication by considering both ρ (import demand elasticity) and Hjt (industry-level Herfindahl index)
to determine sequential complements/substitutes. More specifically, we take the product of import
demand elasticity in absolute terms and Hjt, and define a dummy variable d complrho alpha ind
based on below and above median values of this product. The higher the import demand elasticity
in absolute terms (ρ) and higher the Herfindahl index (inverse α), i.e. the lower the technological
substitutability, more likely that ρ > α, hence complements.
Since the Herfindahl index based approach to measuring α comes with certain limitations, in our
third attempt to separate sequential substitutes/complements we modify the Alfaro et al. (2015)
approach starting from the premise that α is closely related to the elasticity of demand for each
intermediate input by firms in a certain industry. Following this, we define α as the weighted
average of demand elasticities of the intermediate and capital good imports by a firm where a firm’s
import shares are used for weighting. We then take the difference between ρ and this α measure and
define complements when the difference is greater than 0 (d complrho alpha elast = 1), and substitutes
when it is below 0 (d complrho alpha elast = 0).
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4.3 Upstreamness/downstreamness
Since we observe import transactions at the firm-level, we are able to identify the position of imported
inputs in the value chain of a concrete firm’s output, which we define by its core export product at
6-digit level of the HS classification. Hence our upstreamness measure, namley Upstrijt, is industry-
pair specific in the same manner as Alfaro et al. (2015) and following Fally (2012) and Antra`s et al.
(2012), and is expressed as the “average” distance of each input h from the final demand in product
k, for each pair h, k.
Following Alfaro et al. (2015), upstreamness of an input h in the production of output k is a
weighted average of the number of stages it takes for h to enter in k’s production measured as:
Upstrhk =
dhk + 2
∑M
m=1 dhmdmk + 3
∑M
m=1
∑M
n=1 dhmdmndnk + ...
dhk +
∑M
m=1 dhmdmk +
∑M
m=1
∑M
n=1 dhmdmndnk + ...
, (8)
where dhk denotes direct requirement coefficient of input h in output k (where h, k = 1, ...,M).
The denominator is an infinite sum over the value of h’s use that enters exactly l stages removed from
the production of k, while the numerator is similarly an infinite sum, but there each term is multiplied
by an integer (the number of stages upstream at which the input value enters the production process).
A larger Upstrhk, that is greater than 1 by construction, means that a greater share of the total
input use value of h is accrued further upstream in the production process for k. We use 2002 US
Input-Output table provided by Industry Benchmark Division (IBD) of Bureau of Economic Analysis
since the detailed input-output table for Slovenia is not available. U.S. SIC/NAICS product classes
and industries from US Direct Requirements matrix are matched to HS codes of firms’ core export
product and imported inputs based on concordance provided by Pierce and Schott (2009) (available
at: http://www.nber.org/data-appendix/w15548/readme.txt).
4.4 Descriptive statistics
Some of the key descriptive statistics of the analyzed variables are reported in Table 1, where we
distinguish between sequential substitutes and complements based onbased on rho (dcompl).
Around 18% of import transactions are carried out by firms with outward FDI in at least one year
throughout the 2007-2010 period, and 3% transaction by firms with outward FDI in a particular
sourcing country in a given year where the share is slightly higher for sequential complements.
However, less than 0.1% of import transactions are classified as integrated when condition of being
classified under the core activity of the affiliate at the 4-digit industry level is applied. There are no
notable differences observed between sequential complements and substitutes with respect to average
upstreamness of their inputs, the sourcing countries effectiveness of IPR protection and rule of law
implementation. They are as well similar, on average, in terms of their age, export propensity and
financial leverage. However, compared to sequential substitutes, firms with their core export product
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characterized by complementarity of the suppliers investments along the value chain are on average
smaller in terms of number of employees with lower average capital intensity of their production.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Substitutes Complements
(d compl =0) (d compl =1)
Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev
d OutFDI 0.1792 0.383 0.1876 0.390
d OutFDI bilateral 0.028 0.166 0.032 0.177
d integr 4dig 0.0004 0.019 0.0003 0.018
Upstreamness 2.530 1.073 2.511 1.071
IPR index 4.521 0.252 4.519 0.2428
Rule of law index 1.297 0.647 1.296 0.650
IM demand elasticity (abs) 0.872 0.193 1.550 3.564
Inputs demand elasticity (abs) 1.118 1.019 1.190 0.738
Age 14.347 7.436 14.189 7.522
Employment 64.635 378.537 52.311 176.570
Ex-Propensity 0.306 0.320 0.294 0.322
K-intensity 96,659 642,423 83,036 292,799
Debt assets ratio 0.647 0.280 0.653 0.375
No of observations 460,757) 348,392
Note: Capital intensity (K-intensity) is expressed in EUR.
5 Empirical Specifications and Results
5.1 Empirical model specifications and methodological issues
5.1.1 Empirical specifications
The firm’s decision to integrate suppliers in a certain market, i.e. its propensity to transact an
input in a particular source country within firm boundary, is defined on the firm-market-product
level based on the core activity of the affiliates in the spirit of Alfaro et al. (2015). The binary
dependent variable of integration of a particular input from a particular country in a given year by
a firm (d integrihjt) is based on requirement that an input a firm imports from a particular country
is classified under the core activity of its eventual affiliate located in that country at the 4-digit
industry level in a given year. We base our empirical model specifications on the Antra`s and Chor
(2013) model, and following our model’s predictions augment it with the level of the IPR protection
in a sourcing country.
In addition to the direct impact of IPR on integration of input suppliers in a certain market, the
model predicts that IPR affects internalization decision also indirectly through influencing the inter-
action between input substitutability (complements/substitutes) and upstreamness. Since we have
input-specific measure of upstreamness for each firm in each market, we can test these predictions
by augmenting Antra`s and Chor (2013) empirical model with the level of sourcing countries’ IPR
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protection and its three-way interaction with Upstr and d compl variables:
Pr(d integrihjt = 1) = β0 + β1Upstrhk + β2d complit + β3IPRjt + β4Upstrhk ∗ d complit +
+β5IPRjt ∗ d complit + β6IPRjt ∗ Upstrhk + β7IPRjt ∗ d complit ∗ Upstrhk +
+X ′itβ8 +
∑
β9,jd industryk +
∑
β10,td countryj +
∑
β11,td yeart + uihjt , (9)
where subscripts i, h, k, j and t refer to firms, inputs, (core) outputs, countries and years, re-
spectively. The level of IPR protection (IPRjt) is measured as logarithm value of the Park index.
Besides the complementarity and upstreamness variables, explained in the previous section, in the
model specification we include vector Xit of standard, firm-specific controls: firm’s age, size, capital
intensity of production, labor productivity, export orientation and financial leverage. In particular,
the size of a firm (sizeit) is measured by the number of employees. The variable ageit denotes a firm’s
age counting from the formation year according to the Business Register of the Republic of Slovenia.
Further, we include capital-intensity (K intensityit), measured by fixed assets per worker, which
according to the Olley and Pakes (1996) model affects the distribution of future plant productivity
and may act as a proxy for unobserved sources of efficiency. Productivity is measured in terms of
labor productivity, defined by value added per employee (L productivityit). Export orientation is
defined as the share of exports in total sales of a firm (Ex Propensityit) and financial leverage as
debt to assets ratio (Debt assetsit).
We also include sets of (i) annual dummy variables to control for macroeconomic shocks, (ii) part-
ner country dummies to take account for country-specific time-invariant effects, and (iii) industry-
specific effects, where we define a firm’s industry participation based on its core export product at
1-digit level of Harmonised System classification.
However, to observe and compare the heterogeneous impact of IPRs at different stages of the
supply chain for the two cases of sequential complements and substitutes in a more direct manner, our
preferred specification separates the sample into sequential complements and substitutes based on
our alternative definitions of ρ and α. Split-sample specifications allow us to reduce the complexity
of triple interaction to one interaction term between IPR and the upstreamness measure. For the
sample split between sequential complements and substitutes, the specification turns to
Pr(d integrihjt = 1) = β0 + β1Upstrhk + β2IPRjt + β3IPRjt ∗ Upstrhk +
+X ′itβ4 +
∑
β5,jd industryk +
∑
β6,td countryj +
∑
β7,td yeart + uihjt . (10)
5.1.2 Methodological issues
We use probit specification of our integration decision model (9-10). There are certain potential
econometric concerns of estimating probit models that need discussion. In line with heterogeneous
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firm dynamics models the variability of firm growth usually decreases with firm size, suggesting that
variance is not constant across firms. This might as well hold for firm integration decision. Therefore,
we first test if firm size affects the conditional variance of the firms integration decision to detect
potential heteroscedasticity. When Wald’s test for heteroscedasticity rejects the null hypothesis of
homoscedastic variance (i.e. H0 : ln(σ
2
i ) = 0) we apply a maximum-likelihood heteroscedastic probit
model that generalizes probit model by allowing the scale of the inverse link function to vary from
observation to observation as a function of the independent variables (a firm size). Secondly, to deal
with endogeneity which is caused by unobserved firm-specific effects we employ parameterization of
unobserved firm-specific effects by firm-level means of all time-varying independent variables over
the sample period, in the manner suggested by Mundlak (1978), Chamberlain (1984) and Wooldridge
(2002). Additionally, we estimate random effects probit model and explicitly exploit panel structure
of our data where unit of observation refers to firm-country-product level. Since we cannot control
for these effects in the pooled probit model, this panel approach allows controlling for everything
that remains constant during the sample interval with a partner country-product pair, i.e. firm-
country-product fixed effect. In the random effects model, firm-country-product specific effects are
assumed a random variable that is uncorrelated with the explanatory variables.
5.2 Core results
We start with the results of specifications based on import demand price elasticities (ρ measure)
and later on continue with the alternative specifications based on α measures. Table 2 depicts
the results for the pooled sample with triple interaction, while Table 3 reports the split-sample
results where sequential complements and substitutes are separated based on import demand price
elasticities (ρ). Column (1) in Table 2 and columns (1)-(2) of Table 3 show the results of probit
model with the robust standard errors adjusted for firm clusters. When Wald’s test rejects the null
hypothesis of homoscedastic variance, the heteroscedastic probit model results are reported instead.
Further, column (2) of Table 2 and columns (3)-(4) in Table 3 refer to specifications that, following
Mundlak (1978), Chamberlain (1984), and Wooldridge (2002), include firm-level means of all time-
varying independent variables over the sample period to control for unobserved firm-specific effects.
Columns (3) and (5)-(6) in Tables 2 and 3, respectively, instead report the results estimated by
random effects probit model where unobserved heterogeneities for each firm-country-product pair
that are invariant over time are controlled for.
The results based on the aggregate sample presented in Table 2 confirm significant differences in
the impact of IPR and upstreamness position on incidence of firm vertical integration of the inputs
between sequential complements and substitutes as indicated by the significant interaction terms
between dummy variable for the complements (d compl) on one hand and IPR (lnIPR), upstream-
ness position (Upstr) and lnIPR ∗ Upstr interaction on the other. The interaction of IPRs with
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complementarity is negative and highly significant suggesting that improvement in IPR protection
on average encourages outsourcing when inputs are sequential complements compared to substitutes.
The positive and significant double interaction term, in turn, shows that this phenomenon is less
likely at upstream stages, and therefore occurs downstream. Moreover, the significantly negative
interaction between complementarity and upstreamness confirms that the Slovenian sample is consis-
tent with Antra`s and Chor (2013) prediction in that likelihood of integration decreases with moving
upstream the production chain for complements, compared to the substitutes where the impact of
the upstreamness on integration is positive, yet insignificant.
Splitting the sample (Table 3) allows us to see in a more direct manner that the statistical sig-
nificance of the coefficients of IPR protection and its interaction with upstreamness are in fact only
true for the case of sequential complements which is in line with the model prediction 3 stating the
IPRs bear more relevant implications for the sequential complements. Again, IPRs tend to reduce
the propensity to integrate (significantly negative coefficient for IPRs in all specifications), and this
tends to be the case for relatively downstream stages as denoted with the positive coefficient of
the interaction between IPRs and upstreamness, which becomes weakly significant once the firm-
county-product effects are controlled for in the random effects specification in column (5). This
result presents a support for the model prediction 1. Regarding the effect of the position along the
value chain, again the impact of upstreamness on integration versus outsourcing decision differs for
complements and substitutes (confirmed based on Chow test of equality of regression coefficients be-
tween two groups); the impact of upstreamness is, in line with Antra`s and Chor (2013), significantly
negative for complements whereas for substitutes the regression coefficient is insignficiant.
The controlling firm-specific explanatory variables of vertical integration are largely in line with
the theoretical expectations. Results indicate that larger and older firms with higher export propen-
sity are more likely on average to integrate inputs, all else being equal, as confirmed by positive
and significant regression coefficients in most specifications for both complements and substitutes.
The only exception are the Mundlak/Chamberlain/Wooldridge-type specifications (3) and (4) in
Table 3, where the period averages take up the effect of export propensity. This explains as well
the insignificant impact of the export propensity in aggregate sample specification (2) from Table
2. On the other hand, capital intensity of a firm’s production process proves to have the opposite
impact on integration versus outsourcing decision for complements and substitutes, namely positive
for complements and negative for substitutes. Such difference in the impact on the incidence of in-
tegration between complements and substitutes is observed as well for labor productivity in random
effects specifications (5-6), but the results are not robust. The heterogeneous effect of the capital
intensity and firm productivity provides a plausible explanation for their less consistent impact in
aggregate sample specifications that pool together both sequential complements and substitutes.
Firm’s financial leverage measured by debt to assets ratio tends to exhibit negative effect on the
24
Table 2: Probit and random effects (RE) probit model of integration at firm-market-product level
for pooled sample - triple interaction specification, rho measure
(1) (2) (3)
probit probit RE probit
Chamberlain-Mundlack
Rho Rho Rho
d compl 11.820** 12.352** 27.145***
1 (5.494) (5.565) (9.455)
lnIPR 0.705 0.879 -2.120
(2.332) (2.538) (4.196)
d compl # lnIPR -7.712** -8.067** -17.495***
1 (3.757) (3.796) (6.329)
Upstr 0.639 0.669 0.419
(0.916) (0.910) (2.292)
d compl # Upstr -6.508* -6.831* -13.076**
1 (3.519) (3.620) (5.983)
lnIPR# Upstr -0.587 -0.608 -0.645
(0.679) (0.674) (1.577)
d compl # lnIPR # Upstr 4.242* 4.451* 8.476**
1 (2.330) (2.392) (3.980)
lnSize(-1) 0.147*** 0.880** 0.529***
(0.050) (0.362) (0.194)
Age 0.046*** 0.047*** 0.214***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.027)
Ex propensity(-1) 1.217*** -0.512 5.528***
(0.302) (0.746) (0.631)
lnK intensity(-1) -0.037 0.221 -0.418**
(0.144) (0.234) (0.187)
lnL productivity(-1) 0.100 0.593*** 0.562**
(0.095) (0.225) (0.229)
Debt assets(-1) -0.682 -0.618 0.419
(0.454) (0.621) (0.661)
lnSize avg -0.738**
(0.351)
Ex propensity avg 1.840**
(0.801)
lnK intensity avg -0.248
(0.240)
lnL productivity avg -0.492**
(0.228)
Debt assets avg -0.140
(0.610)
lnDist -0.053
(0.167)
lnGDP -0.026
(0.126)
lnGDPpc -0.351
(0.307)
Constant -7.534** -7.980** -21.064***
(3.469) (3.789) (6.578)
Log pse.likelihood -1473.0456 -1460.1338 -1011.909
Wald test chi2(40)= chi2(45)= chi2(19)=
3265.54*** 3607.38*** 264.28***
Wald’s test for heteroskedasticity (H0: lnsigma2=0)
lnsigma2 0.004 0.005
lempllag (0.054) (0.060)
chi2(1) 0.01 0.01
Likelihood-ratio test; rho=0: chi2(1) (Prob>chi2)
1537.89***
Observations 625,799 625,623 804,115
N. of firm-market-product 450,923
Note: Robust Std. Err. in round brackets, adjusted for firm clusters in (heteroskedastic) probit models;
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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Table 3: Probit and random effects (RE) probit model of integration at firm-market-product level,
rho measure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
probit het.probit probit probit RE probit RE probit
Chamberlain Chamberlain
-Mundlack -Mundlack
Compl Subst Compl Subst Compl Subst
lnIPR -9.164*** 0.347 -9.281** 0.012 -25.62*** -1.125
(3.379) (1.694) (3.705) (1.631) (5.808) (6.074)
Upstr -6.850* 0.071 -7.157* 0.061 -13.680* -0.165
(4.068) (0.668) (4.131) (0.653) (7.220) (3.788)
lnIPR # Upstr 4.258 -0.124 4.460 -0.117 8.078* -0.473
(2.675) (0.496) (2.717) (0.485) (4.758) (2.593)
lnSize(1) 0.265*** 0.272*** 0.983* 0.816*** 1.185*** 1.645***
(0.086) (0.086) (0.543) (0.205) (0.309) (0.308)
Age 0.044*** 0.023** 0.041*** 0.023** 0.250*** 0.295***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.010) (0.009) (0.0648) (0.0397)
Ex propensity(-1) 1.312*** 0.577** -0.708 -0.178 8.076*** 4.208***
(0.357) (0.357) (0.825) (0.927) (1.353) (1.019)
lnK intensity(-1) 0.472*** -0.138** 0.678* -0.033 0.0986 -1.853***
(0.125) (0.125) (0.366) (0.092) (0.497) (0.288)
lnL productivity(-1) -0.002 -0.270** 0.264 0.065 1.141** 0.0254
(0.148) (0.148) (0.282) (0.264) (0.479) (0.454)
debt asset(-1) -1.291** -0.295 -0.102 -0.315 -2.251 -0.985
(0.578) (0.578) (0.829) (0.252) (1.704) (1.325)
lnDist 0.230 -0.221
(0.365) (0.340)
lnGDP 0.530 -0.424**
(0.328) (0.211)
lnGDPpc -0.205 -0.871
(0.558) (0.584)
lnSize avg -0.702 -0.546***
(0.527) (0.209)
Ex propensity avg 2.103*** 0.821
(0.791) (0.856)
lnK intensity avg -0.189 -0.109
(0.345) (0.096)
lnP productivity avg -0.234 -0.341
(0.240) (0.227)
debt asset avg -1.356 0.025
(1.064) (0.018)
Constant 4.090 3.644 -0.221 -23.09* -0.116
(5.475) (6.116) (3.522) (12.64) (10.77)
Country dummies yes yes yes yes no no
time dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry dummies yes yes yes yes no no
Log pse.likelihood -461.23776 -815.8606 -455.4313 -810.2111 -407.63711 -537.90789
Wald test chi2(32)= chi2(28)= chi2(37)= chi2(33)= chi2(15)= chi2(15)=
12383.99* 538.01*** 26385.75*** 1089.99*** 155.38*** 222.89***
Wald’s test for heteroskedasticity (H0: lnsigma2=0)
lnsigma2 0.106 -0.101*** 0.109 -0.102***
lempllag (0.099) (0.037) (0.109) (0.040)
chi2(1) 1.15 7.47*** 1.01 7.20***
Likelihood-ratio test; rho=0: chi2(1) (Prob>chi2)
342.50*** 1005.70***
Observations 251,719 316922 251,688 316,778 346,548 457,567
N. of firm-market-product 220,603 279,576
Note: Robust Std. Err. in round brackets, adjusted for firm clusters in (heteroskedastic) probit models;
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
likelihood of integration but the impact is found to be insignificant in several specifications.
To better visualize the impact of IPRs we present two figures based on specifications (1) and
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(2) from Table 3. Figure 5 plots predicted probabilities of integration for complements at different
stages along the supply chain for low and high value of Park’s IPR index, while Figure 6 represents
average marginal effect of an increase in Park’s measure (lnIPR) on probability to integrate at
different stages along the supply chain for complements and substitutes.
Figure 5: Predictive margins
Notes: Based on regression from Table 3, column 1 (Table 3, column 1)
Figure 6: (Average) Marginal effects of the level of IPR protection
Notes: Based on regression from Table 3, columns 1-2;
the IPR variable is here expressed as the log of the Park index.
Putting the figures alongside the Tables 2 and 3 suggest that IPR protection bears a heteroge-
neous impact on producers’ propensity to integrate suppliers with respect to their position in the
supply chain and sequential complementarity/substitutability of their investments. More specifically,
improvement in the level of IPR protection decreases the likelihood of integration of the suppliers
in more downstream parts of the production process (for low value of Upstr) in industries in which
suppliers’ investments along the value chain are sequential complements (as depicted by negative
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values of the marginal effects in Figure 5 for the most downstream positions and decreasing curve
for complements in the downstream stages in Figure 6). We instead observe no significant effect
on the propensity to integrate in more upstream stages under sequential complements and at all
stages when inputs are sequential substitutes, which explains the irrelevance of IPRs in the latter
case. These results reinforce the hypothesis that things may differ with respect to the organizational
decision of firms when studying intangible assets under the property rights approach. Imitation and
IPRs are important factors in the organizational decision of firms along the supply chain, and that
they do not coincide with decisions based on the contractual environment. Recall that under the
property right theory for tangible assets we expect contract enforcement to increase the prevalence of
integration over outsourcing. We can also deduce from these results that our findings are specific to
IPR protection and cannot be generalized to other regulatory measure that directly affect contract
enforcement.
Table 4 replicates the same regressions from Table 3 but replaces the IPR index with a measure
of the Rule of law from the Worldwide Governance Indicators (2015) database to see how things
fair for contract enforcement in a property right environment. The results clearly show the opposite
impact for rule of law on firm integration decision, i.e. significantly negative impact for substitutes
in all specifications and positive effect for complements which is significant in specifications (1) and
(3) while insignificant in random effect probit specification from column (5). The interaction term
between rule of law and upstreamness is not significant in neither of specifications from Table 4.
In Table 5 we finally present the results based on three alternative approaches for identification
of the sequential complements and substitutes to the one based on ρ (import demand elasticities)
which we rely on in Tables 2 and 3. In columns (1)-(2) on Table 5 we use industry-average value
of the Herfindahl index as a proxy for (inverse) α to distinguish between complements and substi-
tutes (d complalpha ind). Next, in columns (3)-(4) sequential substitutes/complements identification
is carried out by considering both ρ (import demand elasticity) and industry averages of Herfind-
ahl index to determine sequential complements/substitutes (d complrho alpha ind), while in columns
(5)(6), specifications are based on the difference between ρ and the α measure estimated based on
demand elasticities of the intermediate and capital good imported inputs (d complrho alpha elast).
We employ random effects probit estimator that allows controlling for unobserved heterogeneity at
detailed firm-county-product level. Likelihood-ratio test rejects the hypothesis of ρ = 0 in all specifi-
cations and confirms the importance of the unobserved heterogeneity (“frailty”) in this sub-sample.
Hence, we proceed with the interpretation of random effects probit results.
Results show that our findings from Tables 2 and 3 are fully robust to these alternative ways of
separating complements and substitutes. The impact of the effectiveness of the protection of IPRs is
significantly negative in all specifications for the case of complements. Moreover, the interaction term
with upstreamness becomes even more significant reinforcing our expectation of the more important
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Table 4: Probit and random effects (RE) probit model of integration at firm-market-product level
with Rule of law, rho measure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
probit het.probit probit het.probit RE probit RE probit
Chamberlain Chamberlain
-Mundlack -Mundlack
Compl Subst Compl Subst Compl Subst
Rule of law 1.276** -0.537** 1.296** -0.578** -0.735 -1.464**
(0.643) (0.252) (0.607) (0.262) (0.554) (0.685)
Upstr -0.059 -0.120* -0.057 -0.119* -0.649*** -0.823***
(0.142) (0.064) (0.141) (0.067) (0.206) (0.218)
Rule of law # Upstr -0.168 0.025 -0.170 0.024 -0.256 0.026
(0.111) (0.034) (0.111) (0.035) (0.217) (0.236)
lnSize(-1) 0.174*** 0.219*** 0.672* 0.372** 0.760*** 0.954***
(0.061) (0.030) (0.361) (0.148) (0.150) (0.130)
Age 0.019** 0.018*** 0.018** 0.017*** 0.132*** 0.162***
(0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.029) (0.026)
Ex propensity(-1) 1.446*** 0.402*** 0.217 -0.698 6.427*** 3.244***
(0.257) (0.135) (0.701) (0.486) (0.659) (0.705)
lnK intensity(-1) 0.270*** -0.051 0.377** -0.079 0.881*** -0.643***
(0.092) (0.065) (0.151) (0.072) (0.266) (0.241)
lnL productivity(-1) 0.113 -0.247*** 0.131 -0.130 0.674*** -0.812***
(0.087) (0.085) (0.192) (0.144) (0.234) (0.287)
Debt assets(-1) -0.810** -0.231 -0.459 -0.218 -1.928** -0.172
(0.367) (0.201) (0.732) (0.230) (0.917) (0.899)
lnDist -0.581* -0.964***
(0.307) (0.345)
lnGDP -0.379** 0.747***
(0.163) (0.186)
lnGDPpc -1.518*** -1.619**
(0.590) (0,717)
lnSize avg -0.499 -0.159
(0.337) (0.151)
Ex propensity avg 1.259* 1.174**
(0.748) (0.521)
lnK intensity avg -0.095 0.031
(0.145) (0.098)
lnL productivity avg -0.001 -0.113
(0.148) (0.138)
Debt assets avg -0.412 -0.002
(0.686) (0.091)
Constant -10.196*** -0.273 -10.523*** -0.328 -12.240** 26.729***
(1.276) (1.521) (1.303) (1.565) (5.270) (7.513)
Country dummies yes yes yes yes no no
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry dummies yes yes yes yes no no
Log pse.likelihood -1261.2475 -1582.473 -1254.7063 -1574.093 -815.9058 -875.1844
Wald test chi2(39)= chi2(33)= chi2(39)= chi2(38)= chi2(15)= chi2(15)=
9017.75*** 1097.95*** 9064.68*** 1193.74*** 261.95*** 364.50***
Wald’s test for heteroskedasticity (H0: lnsigma2=0)
lnsigma2 -0.013 -0.093*** -0.013 -0.092***
lempllag (0.048) (0.032) (0.048) (0.034)
chi2(1) 0.08 8.66*** 0.07 7.33***
Likelihood-ratio test; rho=0: chi2(1) (Prob>chi2)
880.22*** 1385.04***
Observations 282,818 368,206 282,771 368,060 361,415 475099
N. of firm-market-product 230,738 291,317
Note: Robust Std. Err. in round brackets, adjusted for firm clusters in (heteroskedastic) probit models;
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
role of IPRs in downstream stages of the production process. The results indicate that outsourcing
becomes more likely with improved IPR, which holds for the relatively downstream stages as denoted
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Table 5: Random effects probit model of integration at firm-market-product level, industry-level
Alpha and combined Rho Alpha ind and Rho Alpha elast (Alfaro et al.) measures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Alpha ind Alpha ind Rho Rho Rho Rho
Alpha ind Alpha ind Alpha elast Alpha elast
Compl Subst Compl Subst Compl Subst
lnIPR -11.374*** -2.568 -18.966*** -0.808 -16.867*** 0.786
(2.442) (4.404) (3.148) (4.360) (2.716) (3.800)
Upstr -4.577** 1.164 -8.553*** 0.266 -8.186*** 0.606
(2.069) (2.672) (2.875) (2.590) (2.634) (2.040)
lnIPR # Upstr 2.744** -1.609 5.430*** -0.940 5.092*** -0.771
(1.398) (1.829) (1.911) (1.765) (1.771) (1.384)
lnSize(-1) 0.348*** 1.266*** 0.496*** 0.414*** 0.747*** 0.375***
(0.107) (0.168) (0.142) (0.137) (0.178) (0.109)
Age 0.191*** -0.002 0.385*** 0.039** 0.338*** 0.139***
(0.024) (0.023) (0.036) (0.019) (0.049) (0.022)
Ex propensity(-1) 4.815*** 8.127*** 9.464*** 1.317** 8.656*** 3.811***
(0.657) (1.394) (1.186) (0.630) (1.046) (0.657)
lnK intensity(-1) -0.420** 0.195 -0.586* 0.026 -0.732*** -0.214
(0.172) (0.244) (0.314) (0.217) (0.259) (0.189)
lnL productivity(-1) 0.583*** 0.340 1.036*** -0.296 1.425*** 0.299
(0.192) (0.293) (0.359) (0.251) (0.331) (0.204)
Debt assets (-1) 0.318 1.846*** -2.654** 0.614 -2.344** 0.060
(0.573) (0.248) (1.186) (0.413) (1.099) (0.605)
lnDist -0.072 0.487** 0.050 -0.494 -0.139 -0.050
(0.162) (0.234) (0.197) (0.365) (0.229) (0.179)
lnGDP -0.025 -0.047 0.017 0.264 -0.138 -0.153
(0.116) (0.203) (0.152) (0.221) (0.153) (0.126)
lnGDPpc -0.366 -0.000 -0.035 -0.898* -0.477 -0.485
(0.291) (0.471) (0.346) (0.538) (0.428) (0.348)
Constant -2.328 -35.426*** -14.641* -3.055 -6.678 -11.978**
(5.195) (7.757) (7.518) (7.328) (7.715) (5.658)
Country dummies no no no no no no
time dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry dummies no no no no no no
Log pse.likelihood -840.6054 -482.4536 -777.3525 -218.0989 -640.9280 -601.2528
Wald test chi2(15)= chi2(15)= chi2(15)= chi2(15)= chi2(15)= chi2(15)=
216.40*** 150.31*** 256.47*** 43.70*** 227.15*** 126.39***
Likelihood-ratio test; rho=0: chi2(1) (Prob>chi2)
1067.47*** 285.43*** 1186.76*** 153.56*** 603.08** 320.29***
Observations 466,797 464,599 402,302 401,813 325,843 473,705
N. of firm-market-product 298,982 299,737 255,663 257,763 216,485 295,521
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
with significantly positive coefficient for the interaction term. On the other hand, for the substitutes
subsample we fail to find any significant effect for IPRs or its interaction with upstreamness on the
likelihood of integration, which is also in line with the model prediction.
6 Concluding Discussion
In this paper we provided a theory supported by empirical evidence that reveal the presence of
intangible assets in global supply chains and their importance for the organizational decision of
firms. We adopt a strategy that considers heterogeneous stages of production along the supply
chain in order to show the consequences of the risk of imitation. Assuming that it is those stages
that are most susceptible to imitation that react most sharply to IPR protection, we test the impact
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of IPRs in the supplier locations on the integration decision of Slovenian firms. The findings suggest
that intangible assets matter most at downstream stages and when stages along the supply chain
are sequential complements. It is under such circumstances that better IPR institutions in supplier
country encourage outsourcing over integration. The results are in line with models of supplier
investment incentive structure, where integration is the default result for downstream stages under
sequential complements.
A helpful point of comparison for our results is the effect of the degree of contractibility on
the organizational mode along the supply chain (Alfaro et al., 2015). This argument explicitly
refers to tangible assets. Starting from an incomplete contract environment, reducing the contract
frictions initially introduced in the model under the property rights approach allows firms to rely
less on outsourcing to compensate for distortions associated with inefficient upstream investment for
sequential complements. Consequently, they reduce the set of outsourced stages on the upstream side
of the chain, where outsourcing was previously necessary and prevalent. This would move the cut-off
stage in Antra`s and Chor (2013) to the left. The opposite should hold when inputs are sequential
substitutes. The key conceptual distinction in our framework is that contract incompleteness is
present at all times, but what changes is the possibility of imitation of intangible assets by outside
competitors, itself determined by the degree of IPR protection in the supplier location. Introducing
this feature produces two notable differences in our results.
The first evident point of departure from Antra`s and Chor (2013) and Alfaro et al. (2015) is that
the case of substitutable inputs is less relevant for the organizational choice of firms when dealing with
intangible assets. Imitation erodes the dynamic effect of upstream investment on supplier incentives
boosted by outsourcing rendering the firm indifferent about the two modes of organization. In
technical terms, sensitivity of β to changes in µ is decreasing in α, that is, the more substitutable
are the inputs. As a result, changes in the level of IPR protection should not significantly affect the
propensity of firms to integrate. This argument also suggests that α, as a real measure of physical
or technological substitutability between stages, can be as relevant as the elasticity of demand (ρ)
to distinguish between sequential complements/substitutes, particularly when considering intangible
assets.
The second divergence arises when looking into the case of complements, where imitation and
IPRs do play a role in determining the organizational mode. In fact, we have seen above that
when considering intangible assets, outsourcing is the organizational form that prevails for a wider
range of production stages in case of stronger IPR protection. This is because imitation risk offsets
the incentive channel and the positive effect of upstream investment created by outsourcing on
subsequent stages. This is clearly in contrast to the effect of contract enforcement itself and how
this liberalizes firms to enjoy a larger share of the revenues, not having the need to outsource in order
to avert inefficient upstream investment. Imitation, on the contrary, blocks this channel of gains
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from outsourcing, making it optimal for the final good producer to forgo the incentive structure and
integrate at an earlier stage. IPR protection reverts this decision and puts the Antra`s and Chor
(2013) mechanism back in place. Notice that the equilibrium restored by IPR protection is the
equilibrium under incomplete contracts.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that in our modeling strategy, we have introduced imitation of
intellectual property within the context of the property right theory so that it could occur under both
outsourcing and integration. Recall first that the imitators in our model are in principle competitors
outside the supply chain relationships, hence the organizational choice should not necessarily have
an impact on the imitation risk. Nonetheless, if imitation were to be adopted using the transaction
cost approach, so that integration could be used to internalize imitation risk and avoid technology
leak to competitors that can be more likely under outsourcing, our main results persist and gain
strength. This is because the results under both concepts go the same direction, and assuming
that imitation is only viable under outsourcing is an extra constraint that would make integration
more attractive under weak IPR protection. We get this result in the absence of such assumption,
highlighting the role of imitation on firm organization through the incentive structure channel of
supplier investment. This also mitigates concerns that firms could strategically select their location
based on the IPR regime in the supplier location, making imitation endogenous in the organizational
mode. As our empirical investigation encompasses a more general environment, we cannot detect
whether the integration decision of firms stems from the supplier incentive structure or attempts to
prevent the dissipation of their technology.
As avenues for future research, we would like to expand the model to allow for several destination
countries, and thereby, include the location decision for each individual stage based on the strength
of IPR institutions. A spider model in which a multinational simultaneously procures inputs from
different locations prior to the assembly of its final product would perhaps be more suitable for
this variant of the model. Empirically, while we use a number of rich databases the combination
of which has allowed us to deal with a complex set of problems, limitations of the data impedes us
from performing a more detailed analysis and from using a larger sample period.
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Appendix A: Mathematical Appendix
A-1. Derivation of program (6)
This appendix reports some steps which lead to derive the theoretical results introduced and dis-
cussed in the main text. As explained in Section 3.3, from a pure mathematical standpoint, our
variant of Antra`s and Chor (2013) bears a resemblance of that of Alfaro et al. (2015), although the
two papers focus on completely different aspects of the interaction between institutional environ-
ment and organization of a sequential production line. We therefore refer the reader to that paper
(and to the original work of Antra`s and Chor (2013), of course) for more technical details on the
matter, herein restricting ourselves to highlight only the most relevant differences that characterize
our framework with respect to theirs.
In deriving program (6) in Section 3.2, for instance, we follow the same procedure that Alfaro et
al. (2015) use to derive program (8) in their body text. Hence, we first solve the supplier’s problem,
which consists of finding the optimal amount of investments, namely x∗(z), that maximizes supplier
z’s surplus, i.e. (1− β(z))r′(z)− cx(z), where r′(z) is the derivative in z of the revenue function
r(z) = A1−ρθρ
(∫ z
0
[
e−µsx(s)
]α
ds
) ρ
α
,
and therefore corresponds to
r′(z) =
ρ
α
(
A1−ρθρ
)α
ρ · [r(z)] ρ−αρ · [e−µzx(z)]α.
The optimal investment level for supplier z can be proved to be
x(z) =
[
(1− β(z)) · ρA (1−ρ)αρ · e−αµz[r(z)] ρ−αρ ] 11−α ,
which plugged into the above expression for r′(z) originates a separable differential equation for r(z),
namely
r′(z) =
ρ
α
(A1−ρ)
α
ρ(1−α) · [r(z)] ρ−αρ(1−α) · [ρ(1− β(z))e−µz] α1−α ,
with solution
r(z) = A
(
1− ρ
1− α
) ρ(1−α)
α(1−ρ)
ρ
ρ
1−ρ ·
[ ∫ z
0
[
(1− β(s))e−µs] α1−α ds] ρ(1−α)α(1−ρ) . (A1)
With this expression in mind, we now turn to the problem of the final good producer which is in
control of the supply chain. This firm has to choose the optimal division of surplus at any stage of
production, thereby solving the following profit-maximization program: max
β(z)
pi =
∫ 1
0
β(z) · r′(z) dz.
35
By differentiating equation (A1), this program can be re-expressed as follows:
max
β(z)
pi = Φ
∫ 1
0
β(z)
[
e−µz
(
1− β(z))] α1−α [ ∫ z
0
[
e−µs
(
1− β(s))] α1−α ds] ρ−αα(1−ρ) dz ,
where Φ ≡ A · ( 1−ρ1−α )
ρ−α)
α(1−ρ) ρ
ρ
1−ρ . This exactly corresponds to program (6) in Section 3.2.
A-2. Optimal Ownership Structure for the Substitutes Case
Following the same approach of Antra`s and Chor (2013), we solve the firm’s problem in our gen-
eralized framework by considering a relaxed version of program (6), in which the firm could freely
choose the function β(z) from the whole set of piece-wise continuously differentiable real-valued
functions, rather than from those that only take on values in the set {βV , βO}. As in their paper,
we reformulate the firm’s problem in terms of υ(z), a real-valued function of z defined as
υ(z) ≡
∫ 1
0
(
e−µs [1− β(s)]) α1−α ds .
The problem thus turns into a program of the type
max
υ(z),u(z)
pi = Φ ·
∫ 1
0
[
1− eµzu(z) 1−αα
]
· u(z) · υ(z) ρ−αα(1−ρ) dυ ,
in which the control variable, denoted as u(z), is
u(z) = υ′(z) =
[
e−µz (1− β(z))] α1−α . (A2)
The Euler-Lagrange equation associated leads to:
1
α
eµzu
1−α
α υ
ρ−α
α(1−ρ) ·
[
(ρ− α)(1− α)
α(1− ρ)
u
υ
+ µ+
1− α
α
u′
u
]
= 0 ,
where υ = υ(z), u = u(z) = υ′, and u′ = υ′′. Out of the three type of solutions that can be outlined
for the above equation, only one generates strictly positive profits, namely
(ρ− α)(1− α)
α(1− ρ)
u
υ
+ µ+
1− α
α
u′
u
= 0 . (A3)
The solution to this second-order differential equation is represented by a first-order differential
equation, that is
u(z) = υ′(z) = C1e−
α
1−αµzυ(z)
α−ρ
1−ρ , (A4)
where C1 is a positive constant, which embeds the constant of integration.
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The first-order differential equation has solution
υ(z) =
[
C2 − (1− α)
2C1
µα(1− ρ) e
− α1−αµz
] 1−ρ
1−α
, (A5)
where C2 is another constant term, inclusive of a second constant of integration.
To find the precise expression of C1 and C2, we impose (i) the initial condition, i.e. υ(0) = 0;
and (ii) the transversality condition, i.e. 1− 1αυ′(1)
1−α
α eµ = 0.
Indeed, by combining the initial condition with (A5) evaluated at z = 0, we get C2 =
(1−α)2
αµ(1−ρ)C1.
By combining the transversality condition with (A4) evaluated at z = 1, we obtain
C1 = α
α
1−ρ
[ (1− α)2
αµ(1− ρ)
] ρ−α
1−ρ (1− e− α1−αµ) ρ−α1−ρ .
Given the expressions for C1 and C2, the value function υ(z) can then be written as follows:
υ(z) = Λ · (1− e− α1−αµz) 1−ρ1−α , (A6)
where Λ ≡ α α1−α (1−α)2µα(1−ρ) (1− e−
α
1−αµ)
ρ−α
1−α . This implies
υ′(z) = α
α
1−α
(1− e− α1−αµz
1− e− α1−αµ
)α−ρ
1−α · e− α1−αµz . (A7)
In the light of equation (A2), the optimal share at stage z turns out to be:
β∗(z) = 1− α ·
(1− e− α1−αµz
1− e− α1−αµ
)α−ρ
α
. (A8)
This solution can be proved to satisfy a sufficient condition for a maximum and can be also charac-
terized as the solution of the firm’s problem when β∗(z) is constrained to take non-negative values.
In the substitutes case (ρ < α), the solution to the unconstrained problem, given in (A8), does not
violate the constraint 0 ≤ β(z) ≤ 1; in fact, it can be proved that
0 ≤ 1− α ·
(1− e− α1−αµz
1− e− α1−αµ
)α−ρ
α ≤ 1
holds for any ρ ∈ (0, 1) and for any α ∈ (0, 1) such that ρ < α. It follows than, exactly as in Antra`s
and Chor (2013) and Alfaro et al. (2015), the solution obtained from solving the unconstrained
problem is necessarily also the one which yields the maximum for the constrained problem.
In Figure A1 of Appendix A-3, we plot the optimal share function (A8) for two arbitrary values of
ρ and α, such that ρ < α. The function is represented as downward-sloping solid line: in analogy with
the baseline model, the (unconstrained) optimal share β∗(z) is a decreasing function of z whenever
supplier investments are sequential substitutes (i.e. ρ < α).
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A-3. Optimal Ownership Structure for the Complements Case
When ρ > α, the optimal share generated by the function that solves the unconstrained problem,
namely (A8), violates the constraint 0 < β(z) < 1, since
[
(1− e− α1−αµz)/(1− e− α1−αµ)
]α−ρ
α
> 1 for
some values of z ∈ [0, 1]. For the complements case (ρ > α), the solution to the firm’s problem must
therefore be obtained by solving the constrained version of problem, formulated as follows:
max
υ(z),u(z)
Φ
∫ 1
0
[
1− eµzu(z) 1−αα
]
· u(z) · υ(z) ρ−αα(1−ρ) dυ
s.t. 0 < e
α
1−αµzu(z) < 1
υ(0) = 0 (initial condition)
where z ∈ [0, 1] and υ′(z) = u(z), while Φ is the constant term introduced in Appendix A-1. As in
the constrained problem, the optimal share at each of production is given by β(z) = 1−eµzυ′(z) 1−αα .
The Hamiltonian function associated with this problem is therefore
H(υ, u, z, λ) =
[
1− eµzu 1−αα ] · u · υ ρ−αα(1−ρ) + λu+ θ(1− e α1−αµzu) ,
which implies the following costate equation: λ′ = −∂H∂υ = − ρ−αα(1−ρ)υ
ρ−α
α(1−ρ)
[
1− eµzu 1−αα ]uυ .
At the same time, the first-order condition of the firm’s problem, namely ∂H/∂u = 0, implies
λ = −υ ρ−αα(1−ρ)
(
1− (1/α)eµzu 1−αα
)
+ θe
α
1−αµz.11 According to this, the total derivative of λ turns out
to be:
λ′ = − ρ− α
α(1− ρ)υ
ρ−α
α(1−ρ)
[
1− 1
α
eµzu
1−α
α
]u
υ
+
1
α
eµzu
1−α
α υ
ρ−α
α(1−ρ)
[1− α
α
u′
u
+ µ
]
+ F (z, θ′, θ) .
Putting together the above equation and the costate equation, one gets
1− α
α2
eµzu
1−α
α υ
ρ−α
α(1−ρ)
[ρ− α
1− ρ
u
υ
+
u′
u
+
α
1− αµ
]
+ F (z, θ′, θ) = 0 (A9)
When the constraint u ≤ 1 (i.e. β(z) ≥ 0) does not bite, then θ′ = θ = 0 and equation (A9)
delivers exactly the same second-order differential equation of the constrained problem, namely
equation (A3), thus the solution is still u = υ′(z) = C1e−
α
1−αµzυ(z)
α−ρ
1−ρ , i.e. equation (A4).
Notice that for υ(z) sufficiently small (in particular, in the neighborhood of z = 0), and given
ρ > α, we necessarily have that e
α
1−αµzυ′(z) > 1, which means that the constraint e
α
1−αµzυ′(z) ≤ 1
must bind, implying θ > 0. The costate equation implies that λ′ = 0. In light of the first-order
condition ∂H/∂u = 0, this in turn implies that θ is a monotonically decreasing function of z as
11Notice that this equation for λ delivers the transversality condition for this problem. Provided that the constraint
does not bind in z = 1, which implies θ = 0 in that point, λ(1) has to be equal to 0. With some simple algebra we
can therefore derive the transversality condition for this problem, which is υ′(1)
1−α
α eµ = α.
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long as the constraint binds. We can conclude that, if the constraint binds at some point ẑ ∈ (0, 1),
then it necessarily binds (i.e. θ > 0) for any z < ẑ. Hence, we have e
α
1−αµzυ′(z) = 1, which means
β(z) = 0 for all z ∈ [0, ẑ].
Moreover, we can write υ(ẑ) ≡ ∫ ẑ
0
υ′(z) dz =
∫ ẑ
0
u(z) dz, which leads to
υ(ẑ) =
1− α
αµ
[
1− e− α1−αµẑ] (A10)
With this expression in hand, we can now solve the first-order differential equation, represented
by (A4), albeit limited to z > ẑ. The solution is still
υ(z) =
[
C2 − (1− α)
2C1
µα(1− ρ) e
− α1−αµz
] 1−ρ
1−α
,
which is the same equation as (A4). The derivative of υ(z) with respect to z is
υ′(z) = C1e−
α
1−αµz ·
[
C2 − (1− α)
2C1
µα(1− ρ) e
− α1−αµz
]α−ρ
1−α
. (A11)
By combining equation (A11), evaluated at z = 1, with the transversality condition, one obtains
a first expression for the constant term C2. An alternative expression can be derived by combin-
ing (A11), evaluated at z = ẑ with the boundary condition, namely e
α
1−αµẑυ′(ẑ) = 1. The two
expressions, assembled together, lead us to write the constant term C1 as follows
C1 =
[
1
1− α− αρ−α ·
(1− α)2
µα(1− ρ) (e
− α1−αµ − e− α1−αµẑ)
] ρ−α
1−ρ
. (A12)
We now use equation (A10). If combined with (A11) evaluated at z = ẑ, this equation delivers a
new expression for C1, namely
C1 =
(1− α
αµ
) ρ−α
1−ρ
[
1− e− α1−αµẑ
] ρ−α
1−ρ
. (A13)
Equations (A12) and (A13), assembled together, allows for identifying stage ẑ, based on the following
equation:
e−
α
1−αµẑ =
e−
α
1−αµ − (1− α− αρ−α ) 1−α1−ρ
1− (1− α− αρ−α ) 1−α1−ρ
. (A14)
Plugging equations (A14), (A13), (A12) and the expression for C2 into (A11), we can finally derive
the optimal share function β∗(z) for all z > ẑ, that is
β∗(z) = 1− α
[
1 + χ · e
− α1−αµ − e− α1−αµz
e−
α
1−αµ − 1
]α−ρ
α
, where χ ≡ (1− ρ)(1− α
− αρ−α )− (1− α)
(1− ρ)α− αρ−α .
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Hence, the solution to the constrained problem, which solve the firm’s (relaxed) problem in the
complements case (i.e. when ρ > α) is:
β∗(z) = max
0, 1− α
[
1 + χ · e
− α1−αµ − e− α1−αµz
e−
α
1−αµ − 1
]α−ρ
α
 . (A15)
In Figure A1, the above solution (solid line, downward-sloping) is plotted together with the
solutions to the unconstrained problem for the case ρ > α (dotted line) and ρ < α (solid line,
upward-sloping). As in Antra`s and Chor (2013), the optimal share β∗(z) is a decreasing function of
z as long as supplier investments are sequential substitutes (i.e. ρ < α). Moreover, as in their paper,
β∗(z) in the unconstrained problem is higher than in the constrained problem for all stages z > ẑ:
when upstream suppliers cannot be incentivized by offering them a payoff exceeding their marginal
contribution (as it would be optimal, if the constraint were absent), then the firm finds optimal to
offer (i) full marginal contribution to a larger measure of suppliers, and (ii) a higher share of their
marginal contribution to the remaining suppliers.
Figure A1: Profit-maximizing division of surplus for stage z for the generalized model.
A-4. Cut-off Stages and Proof of Propositions 1 and 2
Propositions 1 and 2 can be proved by considering a particular case of the proof outlined by Alfaro
et al. (2015) for their Proposition 2, which basically generalizes the proof of Proposition 2 in Antra`s
and Chor (2013). Indeed, they introduce asymmetries in the marginal product of different inputs’
investments (in their case, induced by the different relative contractability of upstream stages versus
downstream stages) by means of a stage-specific attribute, namely ψ(i) (where i indexes the stages of
production, instead of z). In our framework, ψ(z) takes on a particular interpretation as a discount
factor for the value of suppliers investments, motived by the exposure to the risk of the final-good
variety being imitated, with a potential loss from imitation that increases over z. Hence, we can
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follow the same procedure sketched in their Appendix A-1.3, setting ψ(z) = e−µz and abstracting
away from heterogeneity in the marginal cost of production across stages.
Consider first the complements case (ρ > α). Given the solution reported in (A15), outsourcing
will prevail at the very beginning of the supply chain, since β∗(z) = 0 for all stages z ∈ [0, ẑ] and βO
is lower than βV . Since the most upstream stages are outsourced, stages to be integrated, if any, will
necessarily be located downstream relative to those that are outsourced, which means that it does
exist a cut-off stage z∗C ∈ (0, 1], such that all stages z ∈ [0, z∗C) will be outsourced, whereas all stages
z ∈ [z∗C , 1] will be integrated integrated within the firm’s boundaries. Outsourcing and integration
will coexist along the production line, conditional on z∗C 6= 1; otherwise, the whole production process
is outsourced.
The existence of this cut-off stage can be established by contradiction, following the line of
reasoning of Alfaro et al. (2015), thus by considering the case of a stage z˜ ∈ (0, 1), such that the
firm decides to integrate in the upstream neighborhood of z˜, and to outsource in the downstream
neighborhood of z˜, thereby violating the pattern described in Proposition 1. Also in our case, it can
be proved that this ownership structure would yield lower profits than an alternative organizational
mode, such that outsourcing would apply to measurable set of stages located upstream than z˜, and
integration would apply to a measurable set of downstream stages, with the same organizational
decision retained for all other stages (consistently with Proposition 1). Hence, deviating from the
pattern described in Figure 4 would simply be inconsistent with the principle of profit maximization.
Similar arguments apply also in the substitutes case (ρ < α), to fully establish Proposition 2.
In this case, the solution to the firm’s problem is represented by the function in (A8). Since β∗(z)
takes value 1 at z = 0 and then it monotonically decreases, it stands to reason that integration
will be the preferred option at the very beginning of the value chain, given βV > βO. The optimal
organizational structure is such that we cannot have a positive measure of outsourced stages located
upstream relative to the measure of integrated stages. Hence, there exists a cut-off stage z∗S ∈ (0, 1],
such that integration occurs at all stages z ∈ [0, z∗S), while outsourcing occurs at all stages z ∈ [z∗S , 1].
If z∗S 6= 1, then the two organizational modes will coexist along the supply chain, preventing from
full integration. The formal proof of Proposition 2 can be obtained by following the same approach
hinted for Proposition 1.
To pin down the level of the cut-offs z∗C and z
∗
S , we proceed as follows. Consider the real-
valued function υ˜(z) ≡ [ ∫ z
0
[e−µs(1−β(s))] α1−α ds] (1−α)ρα(1−ρ) and its derivative with respect to z, namely
∂υ˜(z)/∂z = ρ(1−α)α(1−ρ) · [e−µz1− β(z)]
α
1−α ·
[ ∫ z
0
[e−µs(1− β(s))] α1−α ds
] ρ−α
α(1−ρ)
.
Given this expression, the firm’s profit function in (6) can be re-written as
pi =
α(1− ρ)
ρ(1− α)Φ ·
∫ 1
0
β(z) · ∂υ˜(z)
∂z
dz . (A16)
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In the complements case (ρ > α), Proposition 1 implies that (A16) corresponds to
pi = Φ · α(1− ρ)
ρ(1− α)βO · (1− βO)
ρ
1−ρ
[ ∫ z∗C
0
e−
α
1−αµs ds
] ρ(1−α)
α(1−ρ)
+
+Φ · α(1− ρ)
ρ(1− α)βV ·
[
(1− βO) α1−α
∫ z∗C
0
e−
α
1−αµs ds+ (1− βV ) α1−α
∫ 1
z∗C
e−
α
1−αµs ds
] ρ(1−α)
α(1−ρ)
+
−Φ · α(1− ρ)
ρ(1− α)βV ·
[
(1− βO) α1−α
∫ z∗C
0
e−
α
1−αµs ds
] ρ(1−α)
α(1−ρ)
.
If we maximize pi with respect to z∗C , from the first-order condition of the problem we obtain
∫ z∗C
0
e−
α
1−αµsds∫ 1
0
e−
α
1−αµsds
=
1 + (1− βO1− βV
) α
1−α
[(
1− βOβV
1− ( 1−βO1−βV )− α1−α
)α(1−ρ)
ρ−α
− 1
]
−1
. (A17)
Notice that the condition for z∗C to be in the interval (0, 1) is the same as in the baseline model of
Antra`s and Chor (2013), namely βV (1 − βV ) α1−α > βO(1 − βO) α1−α (which is the condition for the
right-hand-side of equation (A17) to be lower than one). Hence, the degree of appropriability of
intellectual assets does not play any role in determining whether outsourcing and integration coexist
along the production line.
With some simple algebra, the cut-off stage can be proved to be
z∗C =
α− 1
αµ
log
(
1 +
e−
α
1−αµ − 1
ΩC
)
, with ΩC ≡ 1+
(
1− βO
1− βV
) α
1−α

 1− βOβV
1−
(
1−βO
1−βV
)− α1−α

α(1−ρ)
ρ−α
− 1
 .
Consider now the substitutes case (ρ < α). In the light of Proposition 2, the profit function (A16)
can be re-written in a specular way with respect to the case of sequential complements (with βO
instead of βV , and vice versa) and the first-order condition with respect to z
∗
S delivers the following
counterpart of equation (A17):
∫ zS
0
e−
α
1−αµsds∫ 1
0
e−
α
1−αµsds
=
1 + (1− βV1− βO
) α
1−α
[(
βV
βO
− 1
1−βV
1−βO )
− α1−α − 1
)α(1−ρ)
ρ−α
− 1
]
−1
. (A18)
Also in this case the condition for z∗S to be in the interval (0, 1) is not affected by µ, this condition
being βV (1− βV ) α1−α < βO(1− βO) α1−α . The cut-off stage z∗S turns out to be
z∗C =
α− 1
αµ
log
(
1 +
e−
α
1−αµ − 1
ΩS
)
, with ΩS ≡ 1+
(
1− βV
1− βO
) α
1−α

 βVβO − 1(
1−βV
1−βO
)− α1−α − 1

α(1−ρ)
ρ−α
− 1
 .
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A-5. Proof of Proposition 3
We conclude this Appendix with a proof of Proposition 3, which entails re-considering equation (A8),
i.e. the solution to the firm’s relaxed problem, in its unconstrained version:
β∗(z) = 1− α ·
(
1− e− α1−αµz
1− e− α1−αµ
)α−ρ
α
.
The derivative of β∗(z) with respect to µ turns out to be
∂β∗(z)
∂µ
=
α
1− α (ρ− α) ·
(
1− e− α1−αµz
1− e− α1−αµ
)α−ρ
α
e−
α
1−αµz
1− e− α1−αµz ·
[
1−
(
1− e− α1−αµz
)
e−
α
1−αµ(
1− e− α1−αµ
)
e−
α
1−αµz
]
.
The image of the entire domain z ∈ [0, 1] of both the derivative and the primitive function is either
defined over the co-domain R+ or R−, depending on the sign of α − ρ. To make a meaningful
comparison among the impact of IPR (i.e. µ) on β∗(z) in the two cases of complements and substi-
tutes, we consider the absolute value of the above derivative, for a given absolute difference between
parameter α (the degree of physical input substitutability) and parameter ρ (the demand elasticity
for the final-good variety).
Let  be the absolute value of this difference, namely  = |α− ρ|.
Hence, for a given value of , supplier investments are sequential complements if α− ρ = ; and
complements if α − ρ = −. In the substitutes case, the derivative of β∗(z) with respect to µ can
therefore be written as
∣∣∣∣∂β∗(z)∂µ
∣∣∣∣
α−ρ=
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣− · α1− α ·
(
1− e− α1−αµz
1− e− α1−αµ
) 
α
e−
α
1−αµz
1− e− α1−αµz ·
[
1−
(
1− e− α1−αµz) e− α1−αµ(
1− e− α1−αµ) e− α1−αµz
]∣∣∣∣∣∣ =
=  · α
1− α ·
(
1− e− α1−αµz
1− e− α1−αµ
) 
α
e−
α
1−αµz
1− e− α1−αµz ·
[
1−
(
1− e− α1−αµz) e− α1−αµ(
1− e− α1−αµ) e− α1−αµz
]
,
whereas the counterpart for the complements case is
∣∣∣∣∂β∗(z)∂µ
∣∣∣∣
α−ρ=−
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣ α1− α ·  ·
(
1− e− α1−αµz
1− e− α1−αµ
)− α
e−
α
1−αµz
1− e− α1−αµz ·
[
1−
(
1− e− α1−αµz) e− α1−αµ(
1− e− α1−αµ) e− α1−αµz
]∣∣∣∣∣∣ =
=  · α
1− α ·
(
1− e− α1−αµ
1− e− α1−αµz
) 
α
e−
α
1−αµz
1− e− α1−αµz ·
[
1−
(
1− e− α1−αµz) e− α1−αµ(
1− e− α1−αµ) e− α1−αµz
]
.
It is straightforward to show that∣∣∣∣∂β∗(z)∂µ
∣∣∣∣
α−ρ=−
>
∣∣∣∣∂β∗(z)∂µ
∣∣∣∣
α−ρ=
.
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Indeed, the above inequality holds for
(
1− e− α1−αµ
1− e− α1−αµz
) 
α
>
(
1− e− α1−αµz
1− e− α1−αµ
) 
α
,
which, in turns, implies e−
α
1−αµz > e−
α
1−αµ. Given α ∈ (0, 1), the last condition is verified as far as
z < 1, which is always true since z ∈ [0, 1].
We can therefore conclude that, for a given absolute difference between parameters α and ρ,
the optimal share β∗(z) is more sensitive to changes in µ (the strength of IPR enforcement) in
the complements case (α − ρ = −) rather than in the substitutes case (α − ρ = ), as stated in
Proposition 3.
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Appendix B: Data Appendix
Table B1: The GVC participation index, Slovenia 2011 (% share in total gross exports).
Developing Developed
Slovenia countries countries
Total GVC participation 58.7 48.6 48.0
Forward participation 22.6 23.1 24.2
Backward participation 36.1 25.5 23.8
Source: WTO.
Figure B1: The value-added (VA) components of gross exports, Slovenia 1995 and 2011.
(% share in total gross export)
Source: WTO.
Figure B2: Slovenian FDI stock (% of GDP)
Source: WTO.
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